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Rural credit programs in developing countries are designed to help the poorest of
the poor by providing collateral-free loans at a low cost. In order to properly measure
the efficacy of these programs, one needs to examine not only the pecuniary benefits of
the programs but also the non-pecuniary benefits. The micro-loans are mandated for
income-generating purpose such as investing in a micro-enterprise. To elaborate, one
way that credit programs can benefit the poor is by providing them opportunities to in-
crease their income. Another way that these programs benefit is by empowering women.
The credit programs tend to target poor women, thereby providing them with income-
generating opportunities that they otherwise lack. A woman’s potential contribution
to the household income may increase her intra-household bargaining power and em-
power her. This may have far-reaching consequences in terms of household investment
in children’s health and education, as well as a woman’s wellbeing.
In the following thesis, I present two papers that investigate the two different effects
of credit programs. The first chapter examines the effect of borrowing from credit and
non-credit programs on self-employment profits. The second chapter examines the effect
of men’s and women’s self-employment profits on woman’s intra-household bargaining
power and how it differs with the gender of the primary borrower. The self-employment
activities that are considered were primarily funded by the credit programs or by non-
credit sources such as commercial banks and moneylenders.
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1.1 Overview of micro-credit institution
Micro-credit programs are poverty alleviation tools that provide access to loans and
savings for poor people who otherwise lack savings or substantial land- assets to use
collateral. Credit programs, such as Grameen Bank, started in the 1970s and gradually
shifted their target group from men to women in rural Bangladesh.
Dr. Mohammed Yunus, an economics professor, founded the first micro-credit orga-
nization, Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh in 1976. The bank is based on the belief that
credit is a human right; every human being has a right to life in which his basic needs are
met. Poverty, however, challenges this right. One way to challenge poverty is through
increased access to credit. In other words, lending to the poor should be obligatory.
Therefore, the bank provides loans to the credit-constrained and landless poor (who are
defined as those owning less than 1/2 acre of land). The bank uses peer monitoring as
a substitute for collateral. Each member self-selects into a group of five. Furthermore,
even though loans are given to each member, everyone in the group becomes ineligi-
ble (loses future access to loans) if one defaults. Thus, collateral is replaced by group
pressure, increasing the likelihood of repayment.
Peer monitoring provides some additional benefits. Since banks do not normally
observe individuals with high risk of default and this knowledge may be costly to obtain,
banks transfer the liability to the peers. It is often a sunk cost for the peers to gain
knowledge of the individual’s characteristics. Therefore, not only will the members
refuse to group with someone they know will be ‘risky’, but they also will make sure
that group members utilize the loans effectively. In addition to keeping their credit
intact, members may decide to repay someone else’s loan and mentor each other about
timely repayment. This may explain the high loan recovery rate, at approximately 98%,
for the Bank.
However, the downside of the approach is that one’s financial problem becomes the
group’s problem. This may lead to a domino effect where if one member defaults, then
others may default as well, knowing that they have effectively lost loan access. To
prevent this, the Bank has started to disburse loans at different times. At first, two
members of the five- member group receive a loan. If they repay regularly for the next
six weeks, two more members can apply for a loan. The chairperson of the group is
usually the last borrower of the five. Most loans last exactly one year. Therefore, due
to different timing, some members would have to repay before they know the default
status of other members. In addition, those who have already repaid will have a greater
incentive to urge their peers to repay. However, this strategy is not effective in reducing
the domino effect if one of the earlier borrowers defaults. It can take several months for
a group to be recognized or certified by the Grameen Bank. In order to be recognized,
all five prospective borrowers must learn the Grameen Bank’s policies and demonstrate
their understanding of those policies in an oral exam administered by a senior bank
official. Once all members pass the exam, the first loan is issued.
At present, the Grameen Bank has approximately 7.27 million borrowers, 97% of
whom are women. There are 2,459 branches in 79,539 villages. The total amount of
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loans disbursed by the Bank since its inception is US $6.44 billion, of which US $5.76
billion has been repaid. Most loans last one year with weekly mandatory installments.
Repayment starts one week after the loan is issued. The bank charges a simple interest
rate of 20% (declining basis) or equivalent 10% flat rate for income-generating loans.
The repayment amounts to TK20 per week for every TK1,000. The loan amount for the
Bank ranges from TK1,000 to TK16,000. The average loan accounts for about 1.2% of
a household’s total annual income.
These micro-credit organizations usually have some form of mandatory savings to
help borrowers break the vicious cycle of poverty and become self-sufficient. There are
also methods of buffering idiosyncratic shocks to some degree. Grameen requires its
borrowers to deposit 5% of each loan in a group fund and has a mandatory savings
program with interest rate ranging from 8.5% to 12%. In fact, the bank finances 100%
of the outstanding loans from its deposits, 58% of which comes from the borrowers.
Interestingly, since 1998, the bank ceased receipt of donor funds and became fully funded
through its deposits. Since the savings draw interest, I include interest earnings from
the subsequent savings as part of the profit from business. A borrower can take an
interest free loan from the group fund not exceeding half the fund’s total, provided that
all members approve of the amount and its usage. By the end of 1998, group savings
reached $162 million, of which $152 million were saved by women. In addition to micro-
credit, Grameen Bank offers social development programs such as its 16 Decisions, which
teach members to become better entrepreneurs, limit family size and educate children
among other things (Grameen Bank).
The other two programs addressed in this study are BRAC and BRDB. BRDB is
the largest public sector agency in micro-credit lending in Bangladesh. Between 1991
and 1998, BRDB distributed TK10.30 billion as micro-credit to 1.6 million beneficiaries
through 0.12 million groups in 440 thanas or districts (Banglapedia). BRAC, an NGO,
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was originally set up in 1972 by its founder, executive director Fazle Hassan Abed, to
provide relief and rehabilitation assistance to refugees returning from India after the
War of Independence in 1971. Later, BRAC turned its focus to poverty alleviation in
rural areas. BRAC’s credit program was initiated in 1974 and has evolved since then
to incorporate Grameen Bank’s credit schemes. As of December 2002, the organization
had disbursed US$1.8 billion among its members to develop income-generating projects
or micro-enterprizes. Members are also encouraged to save regularly. The savings de-
posited with BRAC amounted to $86 million in 2000. Similar to Grameen Bank, BRAC
provides a number of other services to the rural poor, including health-care, education
and training programs. It places particular emphasis on the training of its members in
trades and income generating activities (Banglapedia).
1.2 Data
The data were collected in an extensive multipurpose quasi-experimental survey in
Bangladesh commissioned by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies-World
Bank in 1991/ 1992 and a follow-up in 1998/ 1999. It was designed to study the im-
pact on borrowers’ welfare from three group lending programs: Grameen Bank, BRAC,
and BRDB. The survey interviewed 1,798 households in 87 villages of 29 thanas (sub-
districts) selected at random from 391 thanas, 24 of which had at least one of the three
credit programs under study in operation, while five thanas had none of them. Three
villages in each program thana were then randomly selected. Three villages from each
non-program thana were also randomly selected from the village census taken by the
government of Bangladesh. Only programs that had been in operation for at least three
years were included. The survey thus has three groups of people: a target group and a
non-target group separated by the exogenous eligibility requirement of land ownership
of less than 0.5 acre. Within the target group, there are participants in one of the three
4
Table 1.1: Number of villages with credit programs and their type
Type of credit BRAC BRDB GB No group Total
Male only 0 9 1 0 10
Female only 7 3 12 0 22
Male and female 17 12 11 0 40
No program 0 0 0 15 15
Total 24 24 24 15 87
credit programs and non-participants who chose not to participate even though they
were eligible for the credit. Thus, the three groups are target-participants, target non-
participants, and non-target. As mentioned before, non-target group was dropped from
the estimation to retain comparison between borrowers and non-borrowers. Thus, the
sample consists of target-participants and target non-participants from program villages,
and target non-participants from control villages.
In a number of the villages surveyed, there were micro-credit programs for both men
and women. However, some of the villages had only male or female credit groups. Table
1.1 shows the distribution of credit programs and the type of program in the village. Data
from male-only and female-only villages help us analyze the impact of credit programs on
outcome variable as differenced by the gender of the participants. The household survey
includes information about household characteristics such as age and education level,
transfers, land ownership, income from agriculture or self-employment, consumption,
savings, amount of borrowing over the last four years, family planning, and fertility
behavior. The survey also documents loans from various other sources over the last four
years from government and commercial banks, moneylenders, and family and friends.
In addition to the household survey, a village-level survey was also administered which
provides information on prices, infrastructure, and wages.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Gender-Based Returns
to Borrowing on Intra-Household
Resource Allocation in Rural
Bangladesh
2.1 Introduction
In recent decades, micro-credit organizations such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh
have created revolutions in poverty alleviation by providing access to credit in poor
communities. In 1976, Muhammud Yunus founded Grameen Bank because he believed
that lack of capital was the primary obstacle to productive self-employment for the
poor. Today, that banking program has been replicated all around the world in both
developing and developed countries 1.
Micro-credit programs provide a two-tiered approach to poverty alleviation. First,
the programs provide credit to the poor. The poor use the credit to purchase capital for
investment in a self-employment activity. The programs target people with little to no
collateral such as land and disburse loans under a group-based system that relies on peer-
monitoring to prevent defaults. In addition to credits, they provide social development
programs such as vocational training, and education about health, family planning, civic
responsibilities, and rights. These non-pecuniary aspects of the programs may add to the
success of micro-credit programs. Substantial resources are being invested in expanding
and maintaining these programs in Bangladesh under the assumption that they help
the poor by bootstrapping them out of poverty 2. Therefore, it is crucial to test this
assumption.
I find that credit effects on profit are positive but less than non-credit effects for
micro-loans, which means that non-credit services have a profit effect that is above and
beyond just the effect of loan amount. In addition, self-employment profit depends
on the lending contract as well as different type of micro-credit banks. The relatively
low interest rate and collateral-free policy, along with the social programs, differenti-
ate micro-credit lending from non-micro lending. Therefore, the effect of participation
on self-employment profit may differ depending on the contract, as well as household
1Micro-Business International (Washington); The Good Faith Fund (Arkansas); ADIE Credit for
Self-Employment (France); Micro Credit Rainbow (Italy); The First’s People’s Fund (Canada) are all
replications of Grameen Bank in developing countries
2World Bank report shows that over the last decade, it provided US $260 million to different micro-
finance projects in Bangladesh. Ten years of World Bank Support for microcredit in Bangladesh
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characteristics such as wealth and education. Households choose how much to borrow
and from where to borrow. There may be unobserved characteristics such as ability or
effort that may affect these decisions and simultaneously affect the level of profit. A
better entrepreneur might wish to borrow more but also may have higher profit due to
his or her ability. This would result in upward bias. I use an Instrumental Variables
approach to identify the impact of loans and borrowing. By exploiting the gender eligi-
bility restrictions in micro-credit villages as well as the program availability in treated
and control villages and cost of borrowing, I control for factors that affect both the
self-employment profits and borrowing and loan size.
I analyze a household data set that contain information on loans and self-employment
activities, as well as on costs and revenues. World Bank collected the data set first in
1992 and resurveyed in 1998 The sources for loans vary and include loans from commer-
cial banks, local moneylenders, government, and micro-credit organizations. The three
main micro-credit programs examined are the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Ad-
vancement Committee (BRAC), and Bangladesh Rural Development Board’s (BRDB)
RD-12 program. Pitt and Khandker (1998) examine these three programs and find that
the credits from all three lending programs have a positive marginal effect on household
expenditures, savings, and assets and a negative marginal effect on male labor supply.
However, these could be due to an income effect of the credit itself since they use the
loan amount to obtain program effects. Murdoch (1998) counters the Pitt and Khand-
ker conclusion by finding negative average effect of credit on household expenditures.
Unlike Pitt and Khandker, MurDoch restricts his analysis to targeted or eligible group
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and compares eligible participants and non-participants from treated villages to eligible
households in control villages. McKernan (2002) finds positive impact of participation
in the lending programs on business profits.
My analysis is similar to that of Pitt and Khandker in that I examine the effect of
loan amount. However, unlike their study, I examine the effect of loan on borrower’s
self-employment profit. The positive effect of loan on consumption and asset could
reflect just a consumption-smoothing effect. A more interesting and important question
is whether these programs effect people’s income levels or business profits. Indeed, this is
what this analysis answers. Moreover, I restrict my sample size to households owning less
than half and acre of land since that is the eligibility requirement to borrow from micro-
credit. This facilitates comparison between borrowers, non-borrowers, and borrowers
from different sources, which is another contribution of this analysis. I include and
compare micro-loans to non-micro loans in terms of their credit and non-credit effects on
household profit. This provides a reference for micro-loans and I can examine how they
perform against the already existing formal and informal credit institutions. Finally,
I take into account the opportunity costs of time when calculating profit. In addition
to the training period, households invest substantial own-labor in the micro-enterprise.
An evaluation of the micro-program participation is incomplete without factoring in
own-time cost.
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2.2 Pathway through which micro-credit affects profit
Micro-credit programs can affect profit via physical capital. As mentioned earlier, lack
of collateral and high transaction cost of small loans often preclude the poor from nor-
mal sources of banking. With little access to credit, self-employment may never be
undertaken or be held at a suboptimal level. Micro-credit can provide credit with which
households can purchase additional capital assets, thereby raising the level of capital.
This enables households to undertake new or expand an existing Self-Employment (SE)
activity. To see more clearly, let us consider the credit market and SE decisions before
and after a micro-credit intervention. Prior to the intervention, assume that households
are in equilibrium. Some households engage in SE while others work in the wage labor
market. Then a micro-credit program decides to locate in the village, offering credit to
the resource scarce and lowering the price for credit. Given this, some households who
were not operating SE now find it optimal to invest in a SE activity. Yet, others in SE
may find it optimal to expand their business. All these would tend to affect profit from
SE.
In addition to the effect through physical capital, micro-credit may also affect profit
through human capital. Most programs bundle social development programs with the
provision of credits. These provide human capital in areas such as literacy, empow-
erment, legal and political awareness, investment strategies, civil responsibilities, and
vocational trainings. These can directly increase stock of human capital. Moreover, the
group-based mechanism can also indirectly affect human capital. Group-based programs
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such as BRAC, BRDB, and Grameen Bank encourage members to help one another with
advice. Beyond this, the group-based feature provides incentive for members within a
group to share human capital. Since there is joint liability for the loan within a group,
it benefits all members to share information, provide advice, and help each other, so
that default, which can lead to loss of future access to credit for all members, is less
likely. Varian (1990) presents a incentive model which shows that highly productive
agents have incentive to share knowledge with agents with less productivity under a
group-based mechanism because highly productive agents will loose access to capital
in case of default by other members in the group. Thus, micro-credit programs and
their group-based contract encourage human capital sharing which will increase low
productive individual’s profit as well as his productivity.
2.3 Estimation
2.3.1 Estimation strategy
The goal of this chapter is to measure the credit and non-credit effects of micro-credit
program participation on self-employment profit. Moreover, I compare these effects
with credit and non-credit effects from non-micro borrowing. The non-micro borrowing
includes borrowing from government or private banks and local moneylenders. These
loans are under individual lending contract where only the borrower is liable for the
loan.
The conceptual framework for this study is the production theory of a household
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business where a household chooses its input choices to optimize its self-employment
profit in each period. These choices are restricted by a borrowing constraint. The
optimal profit is a function of exogenous prices, household and village characteristics,
and borrowing amounts. The empirical model is a linear approximation to this function.







δ2kDijtk + δ3Xijt + δ4Vj + ijt (2.1)
where
piijt self-employment profit for household i in village j at time t;
Cijtk amount of loan that the household i in village j borrowed from a micro-
credit program or non-micro source k in the past year, where k =
Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB, and non-micro;
Dijtk dummy vector for borrowing; equals 1 if the household i in village j
borrowed from a micro-credit program or non-micro source k in the past
year and 0 otherwise, where k = Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB, and
non-micro;
Xijt vector of household and time variant village characteristics, such as num-
ber of males and female of different ages, land, education, years in busi-
ness, village level prices and wages;
Vj vector of village fixed effects;
ηijt ij + vijt, where ij is household specific error and vijt is iid error term.
The micro-credit programs bundle credit with social development programs (non-credit)
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such as vocational training, information sharing among members, provisions of health
services and awareness and legal awareness. The effects of these are confounded and
maybe difficult to separate, but important nonetheless. It would be beneficial to know
which aspects of program participation lead to the largest changes in people’s income
and profit so that the programs can invest heavily on these aspects. In order to capture
the credit and non-credit effects of both micro-credit programs and non-micro sources,
I include whether the household borrowed from any of the micro-credit banks as well as
from non-micro sources. Additionally, I control for the loan size from the three different
micro-credit banks as well as from non-micro sources. After controlling for the loan
size, any additional effect of borrowing on profit should be attributed to the non-credit
effect. Thus, in this analysis, the main coefficients of interest are δ1k and δ2k. The former
yields the credit effects while the latter yields the non-credit effects of micro-credit and
non-micro borrowing. A hypothesis test of equality between the two sets of coefficients
will reveal whether the credit and non-credit effects are much different.
The specification above includes number of people in the household, age distribution,
education level of the head of the household and the spouse of the head of the household,
and land asset owned by the household. These reflect productivity and thus will affect
household self-employment profit. The education level also reflects any training that
members might have acquired to operate a business. Cultivable land also represents
productive asset which can benefit rural businesses. The data do not have information
about the unit prices of the home produced goods. However, village level goods prices
would capture some of these prices.
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The equation also measures whether borrowing under individual contract affects
profit differently than borrowing under group-contract. Individual contract requires
only the borrower to be liable for the loan, and thus the responsibility of repayment
is not shared by other people. All loans from non-micro sources in the data are under
individual contract. There are formal and informal commercial lenders from whom the
households can borrow, albeit at an exorbitant cost of 36% interest on average. In
contrast, group-based programs impose group liability. If one member defaults on the
loan, then the rest defaults also. Therefore, responsibility for repayment is shared by
all members of the group. All loans from micro-credit programs in the data are under
group contract. A comparison is needed between micro-credit programs and private
lenders because this is an issue of sustainability. If households perform well enough to
pay off loans and make a profit when they borrow from non-micro lenders and there is
demand for loans even at a high interest rate, then micro-credit institutions may not
need to provide subsidized credits at a below market interest rate. A test for this is to
see whether δ1nonmicro is statistically different than zero and similar to δ1micro.
I estimate the self-employment profit equation for the sample of eligible households
living in the micro-credit and control villages. I exclude the households that are ineligible
in the program villages and control villages to enable comparison between the borrowers
and non-borrowers. This means that all households with more than 0.5 acre of cultivable
land were dropped from the sample. The remaining households were either eligible to
borrow or participate in the program villages, or would be eligible to borrow in the
control villages had there been a program.
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2.3.2 Program evaluation issues
The typical program evaluation issues that would result in biased estimation are self-
selection into programs and non-random program placement. These must be addressed
when using data to evaluate the impact of micro-credit program participation on out-
comes such as profit. If households were not self-selecting in these programs but were
randomly picked by some mechanism, then we can just examine the differences in prof-
its of the participants to that of the non-participants to obtain a valid estimate of the
program effect. However, households do self-select into the program; the decision to
join is based on the participants’ and program’s qualities. If these qualities are observ-
able, then one can easily control for self-selection. However, some qualities are likely to
be unobservable. For example, a household’s entrepreneurial ability and willingness to
work hard are qualities that are not readily observed but would affect both its program
participation decision and profit. If the households that join credit programs or bor-
row are better entrepreneurs or are more willing to work than those who do not join or
borrow, then a comparison of profits between participating and non-participating house-
holds would wrongly attribute to the credit program that part of the profits due to the
entrepreneurial ability and harder work of households who self-select into the program.
This would cause the estimates of program effect to be biased upward. The demand
for credit or loan size is endogenous as well. Unobserved household characteristics can
affect both the demand for credit and self-employment profit. These characteristics may
include ability, ambition, effort. I use an instrumental variable approach to account for
endogeneity bias, exploiting variation in gender-specific credit availability at the village
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level.
Non-random program placements may bias the results as well. If programs are
randomly placed, then one can compare the household profits in program villages and
non-program villages to obtain program effect. However, when the program placement
is non-random, simply comparing the profits in both types of villages would lead to a
downward bias of the program effect. For example, suppose that programs are placed
in poorer regions and that a typical household in such a region has poor access to credit
and thus limited ability to purchase inputs for business. Credit program participation in
this region may increase household profit. Even with the program, however, the profits
of household from this region may still be lower than those from wealthier, non-program
villages. This may lead to the erroneous conclusion that credit programs are not effective
in increasing household profits. In the case of micro-credit program placement, the
data show that program placement was indeed non-random 3. While Grameen Bank
was placed in relatively wealthier villages with higher market wage levels and better
public infrastructures, BRAC and BRDB were placed in poorer villages with little to no
infrastructure. I employ village fixed effects to account for differences between villages.
2.3.3 Identification
I use an instrumental variable approach to address the endogeneity bias discussed above.
Eligible households that reside in a village where one of the programs is offered can
3I estimate whether a village has a specific program on village characteristics using, a Probit esti-
mation technique
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choose whether or not to participate into a micro-credit program. The decision to par-
ticipate is thus endogenous. However, these households with choice do not provide the
necessary identification since unobserved characteristics such as entrepreneurial ability
or taste for work that affect the decision to participate may also affect self-employment
profit. Thus, measuring the program impact by comparing profits of participants
and non-participants may confound the participation effect with these un-observables.
Households that are in the non-program villages and eligible for participation if there
were a program in their village would provide identification. If credit programs are
placed randomly across some villages, then households in these villages serve as the
exogenous control group. However, the programs are non-randomly placed based on the
village characteristics and thus the estimation must control for village-specific unobserv-
ables. I employ village fixed effects (FE) technique to address the bias due to program
placement.
Households are exogenously excluded either because of their residence in non-program
villages or through the exogenous gender restriction. Because men can join ‘men only’
groups and women can join ‘women only’ groups, the gender-based restriction is en-
forceable and observable. Therefore, I use the gender-based program design to identify
program effects on self-employment profit. There are three different micro-credit pro-
grams (BRAC, BRDB, GB) and there are some villages where only women can borrow
from micro-credit and some villages where only a man can borrow. The rest of the
micro-credit villages allow both genders to borrow (see Table 1.1). The program place-
ment and gender restrictions lead to six gender- and program-specific dummy variables
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when disaggregating borrowing from micro-credit by the three different programs and
two gender-specific dummy variables. I obtain the first set of instruments by interact-
ing these six gender- and program-specific dummy variables with household land and
education of the head of the household.
Identification on the basis of land ownership requires that it be exogenous to the
population. This requirement may not hold if the households sell land to meet eligibility
criteria. However, market sales of land have been historically documented to be low
in South Asia. For example, using data containing rural farm households in India,
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) find that less than 1.75% of the land-holding households
sold land, a very low percentage. Indeed, the data in this study contain information
on land transactions prior to borrowing and I find no evidence of land sales by the
borrowers to meet eligibility requirement. I also do not find evidence of land purchase
prior to the program participation. In rural Bangladesh, the most land acquisitions are
through inheritances or gifts; passed down from previous generations. Therefore, I treat
land-ownership as exogenous.
To identify demand for credit or size of the loan, I use village average loan amount
from BRAC, BRDB, GB, and non-micro sources. In addition, I use the information on
access to inter-household transfers. These are measured by the number of landed and
living relatives by relationship to the head of the household and the head’s spouse. The
potential transferees satisfy exclusion restrictions if they affect profit only through the
loan or participation in the program. One reason that the exclusion restrictions may not
be satisfied is if household utility and profit are jointly determined. If households are
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risk averse and prefer lower mean profit to higher risk (variance), then having potential
transferees serve as insurance against adverse outcomes may induce them to undertake
riskier businesses for higher mean profit than they otherwise would in the absence of
such insulation. In this case, potential transferees would affect profit other than through
the loans (McKernan 2002).
To identify borrowing from non-micro loan sources, I use distance to the lender from
borrower’s house, its square term, and interest rate. All these variables should only
affect self-employment profit through borrowing and loan size only. The distance to
the lender also identifies micro-credit participation for those households where a woman
borrows. A woman is less likely to be able to travel on her own to the bank. Therefore,
the distance would be a deciding factor in whether or not she borrows but would not
affect her profit.
2.4 Data description
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the household and village level exogenous
variables. The average distances to the nearest market or shop in the village range
from 5 kilometers to 9 kilometers. Many of the villages are very remote. Average loan
size from Grameen Bank is TK 6,710 while average loan size from BRDB is TK 3,352.
Average loan size from non-micro sources is TK 9,874. I differentiate the household level
variables by micro-credit and non-micro borrowers. On average, non-micro borrowers are
more educated than micro-credit borrowers. Highest grade completed by the head of the
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household with non-micro borrowing is 2.16 years of schooling, which is 0.42 years higher
than micro-credit borrowing households. Non-micro borrowers also are wealthier than
micro-credit borrowers in terms of average land-holdings. Another interesting difference
between micro and non-micro borrowers is that micro-credit borrowing households have
more middle-aged and older women on average than non-micro households. Typically,
unmarried women do not borrow from micro-credit programs. In addition, as women
get older, they get wiser and may exercise their will. Therefore, they are more likely to
borrow and borrow from micro-credit organization, which are targeted toward women. In
contrast, non-micro households have more young and middle-aged men than micro-credit
households.4 These statistics show that there are significant differences between the two
types of households and these would affect their self-employment profits differently.
The profit is defined as the sum of the total household yearly revenue from the
business and the value of household consumption from own-production less the yearly
operating cost and opportunity cost of time. The operating expense is the sum of
expenditure: production, raw material, and labor excluding their own. The opportunity
cost of time is the product of the time investment and market wage, and any other time
cost associated with membership. I account for the opportunity cost of household labor
using village level wages for males and females and time investment by both genders.
Previous papers in the literature have ignored the opportunity cost of labor. However,
households on average spend 1,921 hours per year in a self-employment activity. This is
a large time investment that could potentially yield more earnings in the labor market.
4See Appendix 2A for detail descriptions about the variables and sample size
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Therefore, any evaluation study on micro-credit should take into account these large
opportunity costs.
Table 2.2 presents the average profits and percentages of households that are self-
employed disaggregated by micro-credit and non-micro borrowers, eligible non-borrowers
in villages with micro-credit programs, and control villages. Therefore, all households
presented in this analysis meet the eligibility criteria of owning less than half acre of land
in both program and non-program villages. However, some of these households opted
to not participate in micro-credit programs (the households in non-program villages do
not have a choice to participate but they would be eligible if a program were available in
their village). Of these non-participants, some do not borrow at all while others borrow
from non-micro sources. The percentage of households managing an enterprise is only
four percentage points higher for micro-credit participants than for households that are
eligible non-participants. This suggests that credit programs may not play a significant
role in a households’ decision to undertake a self-employment activity. Table 2.2 shows
that non-borrowers in both program and control villages have lowest average profits
than micro and non-micro borrowers. Moreover, non-borrowers’ profits are higher on
average in program villages. However, these higher profits are driven by the households
in Grameen Bank villages which are generally richer than other villages. This also
shows that micro-credit programs are non-randomly placed. On average, non-micro
borrowers in program villages have the highest profit at TK 28,510. The average profit
for micro-borrowers is TK 21,980, with Grameen Bank borrowers making TK 25,741
and BRDB borrowers making TK 17,682. This table shows that there is differences in
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the self-employment profit for different types of borrowers . The table also shows the
loan amounts by micro- and non-borrowers. The average loans are largest for Grameen
Bank and smallest for BRDB.
2.5 Results
This analysis examines the effects of credit and non-credit services provided by the
micro-credit programs on the borrower’s self-employment profits. Moreover, the analysis
compares the credit and non-credit effects of micro-credit loans to those of non-micro
loans. I estimate equation (1) using an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to address
endogeneity bias and village fixed-effect to address biases due to non-random program
placement. I shall refer to this approach as IV-FE.
Table 2.3 presents the results from the first stage regressions of the IV-FE for selected
instruments. There are eight endogenous variables for the full model; four variables for
the source of the loans (Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB, non-micro) and four variables for
the size of the loans from the four sources. The estimates have the expected signs. The
F-statistics from a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments can be excluded from
the first stage equations ranges from 6.67 to 19.88. Six of the eight F-statistics are above
the “rule of thumb” minimum value of 10 for sufficiently powerful instruments (Staiger
and Stock, 1997). The loan interest rate has a decreasing effect on whether households
borrow and how much they borrow. Nearest distance to the lender has a negative effect
on borrowing but a positive effect on how much households borrow. Further away the
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lending institutions are, less appealing is the borrowing and thus would need to be given
a larger loan to offset the higher costs associated with distance. These costs may be
time costs, monetary costs, or social costs. The latter is especially true for a woman
borrower since traveling unaccompanied for a woman is not socially appropriate in rural
Bangladesh. Borrowing from non-micro source is less likely when the bank is further
away from the village of residence. Therefore, borrowers may substitute private loans
for micro-credit loans which are usually in their own village. The distance also increases
the amount of borrowing. The average loan sizes in the village have positive effect on
the likelihood and amount of borrowing as well.
Table 2.4 presents results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed-effects, and IV-
FE estimations for household yearly self-employment profit. All results are qualitatively
similar. However, OLS overestimates the effect of borrowing and loan size on profit when
compared to fixed-effect and IV-FE results. This suggests that unobserved character-
istics such as entrepreneurial ability or effort bias the OLS results upward. The OLS
estimates treat borrowing, loan size, and program placement as exogenous while fixed-
effects estimates treat borrowing and loan size as exogenous but program placement as
non-random. If programs are randomly placed in the villages, then OLS estimates are
consistent and efficient. I perform a Lagrange multiplier test that tests whether fixed-
effects should be included in the model. The χ2 test statistic 121.23 with 40 degrees of
freedom, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that fixed-effects should be excluded from
the model. IV-FE estimates treat borrowing, loan size and program placement as en-
dogenous. I use a Hausman test to measure if the estimates from OLS are significantly
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different than the estimates from IV-FE. The classic Hausman test can be estimated as
(θˆIV − θˆOLS)′(V ar[θˆIV ] − V ar[θˆIV − θˆOLS])−1(θˆIV − θˆOLS). However, the test statistic
is negative which suggests that the inverting matrices are not positive definite. There-
fore, I perform an omitted variable version of the Hausman test. Either the predicted
values of the endogenous variables or the estimated residuals are included as additional
regressors in the profit equation. The null hypothesis is that the OLS parameters on
the potentially endogenous variables are consistent. Therefore, if the predicted values
or the estimated residuals are statistically different than zero, one rejects the null. The
predicted values and the estimated residuals are significantly different than zero. Thus,
I conclude that IV-FE model is the preferred model.
The main results from IV-FE are presented in table 2.5. I present four different
models with different restrictions. The first column does not distinguish among the
different micro-credit banks. It shows that borrowing from micro-credit banks increases
borrower’s profit by TK 8,477 while borrowing from non-micro source increases profit
by TK 4,388. These effects are the non-credit effect or the effect of just the non-credit
services by the banks. The credit effects are also positive. A Tk 1,000 increase in micro-
credit increases profit by TK 380 while the same increase in non-micro loan increases
profit by TK 520. Therefore, even though both the credit and non-credit effects from all
sources are positive, the credit effect from non-micro loans is greater than micro-loans
while non-credit effect from micro-loans is greater than non-micro loans. As mentioned
earlier, micro-credit programs offer lot of social programs and offer group-based loans.
The results show that these additional resources have an effect above and beyond the
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traditional credits.
The second and third columns show the effect of borrowing and the effect of loan
size from different sources, respectively, on profit. Since I do not control for loans in the
second column and borrowing in the third column, these effects are the total effect of
borrowing, which includes credit and non-credit effect. The last column is the full model,
which distinguishes among the different micro-credit banks as well as non-micro source.
BRDB has the largest non-credit effect on profit at TK 15,629, followed by BRAC and
then Grameen Bank at TK 9,700. Non-micro borrowing increases profit by TK 4,800. In
contrast, non-micro source has the largest credit effect on profit at TK 600 to a TK 1,000
borrowed. An increase in TK 1,000 BRDB loan increases profit by TK 520 whereas the
same increase in Grameen loans increases profit by TK 360. The table also presents the
p-values for the Sargan-Hansan test of over-identifying restriction. The null hypothesis
of this test is that overidentifying restrictions are exogenous assuming that identifying
restrictions are exogenous. The p-value for the full model is 0.90, which suggests that I
cannot reject the null hypothesis and establishes the validity of the instruments.
2.6 Discussion
This chapter examines the credit and non-credit effect of micro-credit borrowing and
non-micro borrowing on household self-employment profit. These results confirm that
credit and non-credit effects are different and different micro-credit banks affect profit
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differently. In particular, the group-based aspect and the social programs of the micro-
credit banks affect profits above and beyond the loans and these effects are substan-
tial, ranging from TK 9,700 to TK 15,629. The largest non-credit effect comes from
BRDB. The reason for this is that BRDB has more social services that include training,
awareness-raising, informal education. Another interesting result is that loan effect on
profit is largest for non-micro source. This suggests that poor households can borrow
from conventional lenders at high cost and can make a profit. Microfinance justifies its
relatively low cost of borrowing by arguing that higher cost would hamper the poor’s
profit making ability. The results in this chapter raises question to this argument. The
households may indeed have a time inconsistent preferences or hyperbolic discounting
rather than exponential discounting. Time inconsistent preference implies a conflict
between optimal contingent plan from today’s perspective and that of tomorrow. For
example, today an agent may desire to quit smoking starting from a future date. How-
ever, when the previously set date arrives, his taste may change or he may not find
it optimal anymore to quit smoking. In this instance, the agent would be out all cost
incurred in preparation for the event. This type of preference is shown by hyperbolic
discounting.
Households who are not aware of their time inconsistent preferences may desire to
undertake a self-employment activity in the next period. If funding for this activity
is possible, then they prepare for this by participating into the credit programs and
obtaining loans to be invested into the business. However, they underestimate this cost
in the next period from the perspective of the current period. When the next period
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comes, they may find that they have overestimated their capabilities or business skills.
Because of the low cost associated with micro loans, which includes the lack of collateral,
households may not acquire the necessary information about the actual potentials for
their businesses. In contrast, when banks impose a high interest rate, it increases the
probability needed to succeed in the business. In other words, the benefits of learning
the probability of success or acquiring information outweigh the costs. This may be one
reason for the larger effect of non-micro loans on profit than micro-loans.
In terms of policy recommendations, the results show that non-credit services are
important in raising borrowers’ profits. Therefore, if the goal is to increase profit, micro-
credit programs should expand on their non-credit services. In addition, the banks could
first introduce its non-credit services to the clients. These could include vocational and
business training. Upon completion, clients, especially women participants, are likely to
be more skilled in realizing and making good business plans.
Finally, if microfinance wants to increase the efficacy of its loans relative to those from
conventional sources, they should increase the cost of borrowing. This could be in terms
of higher interest rate or stricter screening process for business loans, lending to those
with good business plan or potential for profit. The higher interest rate means higher
likelihood of profitability for such institutions. They would be free from any government
or donor funds, and would thus become financially self-sufficient. A profitable and
self-sufficient financial institution can provide financial services at a much larger scale,
reaching far more economically active poor than the current alternative. Thus, raising
the cost of borrowing may resolve the issue of sustainability. Critiques may argue that
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higher cost will harm the very poor by excluding them out of the credit market. However,
the extremely poor should not be the responsibility of the financial sector. The basic
needs of the poorest of the poor to overcome extreme poverty should be met by the
government and donor subsidies and grants. These are the responsibilities of the health,
labor, social welfare and other ministries, donor agencies, and charities (Robinson, 2001).
And since subsidized credit is usually rationed, it should be made available to anyone
who not only demands it, but can also utilize it effectively. The scarce government and
donor funds may probably be better spent on other forms of poverty alleviation.
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Household Characteristcs      
Education ratio (female/male) 1.07 1.26 0.98 1.12         -0.13** 
Highest grade completed by female 
spouse 0.99 2.17 0.84 1.27 
 
        -0.42*** 
Highest grade completed by 
household (HH) head 1.65 2.86 1.73 2.16 
 
        -0.42*** 
Household land (in decimal) 8.44 14.29 7.19 10.93         -3.74*** 
Number of people in HH 4.80 2.12 5.08 5.09         -0.01 
Religion (1 if muslim) 0.93 0.64 0.94 0.93          0.10 
Duration of the self-employment 4.97 7.74 6.52 4.37          2.15*** 
Residence in a micro-credit village 0.82 0.38 1.00 0.68          0.32*** 
# of female age 10-20 0.52 0.72 0.55 0.59          -0.04** 
# of female age 20-30 0.43 0.54 0.43 0.44         -0.01 
# of female age 30-40 0.30 0.46 0.35 0.30          0.05** 
# of female age 40-50 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.13          0.06*** 
# of female age 50-60 0.13 0.34 0.22 0.13          0.09** 
# of female over 60 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.09          0.05** 
# of male age 10-20 0.55 0.77 0.61 0.58          0.03 
# of male age 20-30 0.36 0.60 0.36 0.41         -0.05*** 
# of male age 30-40 0.32 0.48 0.34 0.36         -0.02*** 
# of male age 40-50 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.29         -0.03*** 
# of male age 50-60 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.14         -0.01 
# of male over 60 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.13         -0.03* 
# of girls under 10 0.70 0.85 0.74 0.73          0.01 
# of boys under 10 0.70 0.81 0.75 0.72          0.03 
      
Village level variables      
Price of rice (per kg) 11.60 1.65    
Price of mustard oil (per kg) 55.98 5.55    
Price of egg (4-count) 2.58 0.64    
Price of milk  (kg/litre) 14.06 4.09    
Price of potato (per kg) 7.42 2.06    
Price of flour  (per kg) 10.02 1.42    
Price of Sugar  (per kg) 28.94 3.03    
Price of onion  (per kg) 15.71 6.78    
Price of garlic  (per kg) 35.59 13.15    
Price of turmeric  (per kg) 55.56 12.59    
Price of salt  (per kg) 8.14 2.28    
Price of chicken   (per kg) 70.87 19.96    
Price of beef  (per kg) 54.80 13.83    
Price of soap (per bar) 10.70 2.45    
Price of tobacco (per pack)  2.34 0.33    
Nearest distance to the market (km) 9.15 13.51    




















Nearest distance to the weekly 
market (km) 5.11 6.10 
   
      
Household level instruments      
Distance in km to the lender 4.67 9.71 4.26 5.59          -1.33** 
Interest rate (%) 23.98 27.58 17.80 37.03      -14.92*** 
# parents of HH head who own land 0.17 0.48 0.15 0.18        -0.03*** 
# brothers of HH head who own 
land 0.37 0.92 
0.40 0.33         0.07*** 
# sisters of HH head who own land 0.42 0.90 0.45 0.40         0.04*** 
# uncles of HH head who own land 0.75 1.39 0.72 0.81      -0.09** 
# aunts of HH head who own land 0.48 1.19 0.51 0.49   0.03 
# sons of HH head who own land 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.01      0.04** 
# daughters of HH head who own 
land 0.06 0.37 
0.07 0.06  0.01 
# living parents of HH head 0.67 0.76 0.68 0.70       -0.12*** 
# living brothers of HH head 1.63 1.61 1.62 1.70       -0.08*** 
# living sisters of HH head 0.57 0.93 0.56 0.60 -0.04 
# living uncles of HH head 0.74 1.24 0.70 0.90      -0.20** 
# living aunts of HH head 0.25 0.69 0.23 0.26         -0.03 
# living sons of HH head 0.83 1.24 0.97 0.66       0.31*** 
# living daughters of HH head 0.64 1.03 0.74 0.51    0.23* 
      
Village level instruments      
Average village Grameen Loan 
(in thousands of Taka) 6.71 10.15 
   
Average village BRAC Loan 
(in thousands of Taka) 3.69 6.14 
   
Average village BRDB Loan 
(in thousands of Taka) 3.35 5.97 
   
Average village Non-Micro Loan 
(in thousands of Taka) 9.87 13.08 
   
      
Sample size (household-year) 2,873  1,263 598  
                       Note: Mean for all households owning ½ acre or less land i.e. Eligible households. 
                                 All prices are measured in Tk. 69TK= $ 1. All amounts are expressed in 1998 Taka. 
                                 A. Means for micro borrowing households and non-micro borrowing households conditional on borrowing.  
                                 B. Difference is calculated by mean(micro borrower)-mean(non-micro borrower). * difference in mean significant at 10%, ** at 5%, 
                                     *** at 1% 
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Table 2.2. Mean and standard deviation of self-employment  profit by different groups and loan size 
 # Obs 
% self-
employed Mean yearly profit 
Standard 
deviation 
All households 2,873 96% 19,301.63 10890.52 
     Micro-credit program village 2,415 95% 21,218.67 11708.78 
             Micro-credit participant 1,263 96% 21,980.58 13242.21 
                      Grameen Bank participant 533 99% 25,741.26 15309.53 
                      BRAC participant 379 93% 20,672.37 21115.54 
                      BRDB participant 351 98% 17,682.51 11943.46 
             Non-micro borrowers 407 94% 28,510.62 9,634.91 
             Non-borrowers 745 91% 15,570.50 17691.90 
     Non-program village 458 95% 9,193.24 16441.72 
             Non-micro borrowers 191 100% 8834.13 13590.40 
             Non-borrowers  267 99% 9,450.14 18053.69 
     Bank borrowers in program and non- 
      Program villages 598 98% 22,225.99 10232.79 
     
All loans 1,861  12,190.28 14,006.59 
      Micro-loan 1,263  13,398.33 15,424.05 
             Grameen Loan 533  17,801.35 18,384.63 
             BRAC Loan 379  11,153.69 13,881.25 
             BRDB Loan 351  9,135.95 9,096.12 
       Non-micro Loan 598  9,638.83 12,308.69 
All profits and loans are yearly and given in 1998 Bangladeshi currency.  
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Distance to lender -0.019 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 32.22  12.66  21.46  73.62 
 (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (16.62)* (11.21) (7.84)*** (21.48)*** 
Interest Rate -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -19.01 -10.73 -11.81 -6.47 
 (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (6.14)*** (4.14)*** (2.89)*** (0.79)*** 
Average Grameen Loan 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.94 -0.09 -0.01 -0.052 
 (0.000)*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.12)*** (0.08) (0.05) (0.001)*** 
Average BRAC Loan 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.14 0.71 -0.03 -0.057 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.265) (0.17)*** (0.12) (0.34) 
Average BRDB Loan 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.62 -0.81 0.77 0.39 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.90) (0.40) (0.28)** (0.78) 
Average Non-Micro 
Loan 
0.000 -0.008 -0.006 0.003 -0.24 -0.08 -0.01 0.95 
 (0.000) (0.005)* (0.005) (0.000)*** (0.18) (0.12) (0.08) (0.23)*** 
Nearest Distance to 
a Bank 
0.002 -0.002 0.013 -0.004 3.32 35.29 26.84 5.20 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (68.05) (45.89) (32.12) (2.91)* 
R-Square 0.56 0.41 0.41 0.24 0.42 0.26 0.24 0.49 
F-statistics 17.31 6.67 19.88 18.71 16.26 7.29 13.54 15.23 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by households. Loan amount are measured in 1998 taka. All specifications control for household characteristics and local prices and conditions. F-statistic 
is from a joint test of null hypothesis that coefficient estimates on all instruments are equal to zero. * indicates significance at 10 % (** at 5%, *** at 1%). The remaining instruments include 
14 variables of land owned husband’s relatives and of number of living relatives in the village, 3 variables of interaction between household land and whether the village has one of the three 
programs, and 4 variables of interactions between land and average loans from BRAC, GB, BRDB and Non-micro source. All regressions include village fixed effects.  
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OLS FE IV-FE 
Micro-Credit Borrowing 
 
   
      Grameen Bank 
 




      BRAC 
 




      BRDB 
 










Microcredit Loan amount 
 
   
      Grameen Loan amount 
 




      BRAC Loan amount 
 




      BRDB Loan amount 
 




Non-Micro Loan amount 
 




R-Square 0.45 0.49  
Number of observations 
 
2,873 2,873 2,873 
  Note: All regressions include household and village level characteristics  
            The standard errors are in parenthesis, with significance ***-at 1%, **- at 5% and *- at 10%. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Micro-Credit Borrowing 
 
8,477.47    
 (1,758.00)*** 
 
   
      Grameen Bank 
 
 12,950.5  9,716.35 
  
 
(6,491.05)**  (4224.53)** 
      BRAC 
 
 7,275.03  13,620 
  
 
(7,025.11)  (3,783.33)*** 
      BRDB 
 
 4,306.14  15,629 
  
 
(6,928.68)  (4,665.46)*** 
Non-Micro Borrowing 
 
4,388.61 10,921.74  4,804.07 
 (1,664.63)*** 
 
(6,726.28)*  (1,948.97)** 
Microcredit Loan amount 
 
0.38    
 (0.13)*** 
 
   
      Grameen Loan amount 
 
  0.43 0.36 
  
 
 (0.05)*** (0.17)** 
      BRAC Loan amount 
 
  0.56 0.29 
  
 
 (0.32)* (0.22) 
      BRDB Loan amount 
 
  0.24 0.52 
  
 
 (0.29) (0.24)** 
Non-Micro Loan amount 
 
0.52  0.71 0.60 
 (0.24)** 
 
 (0.36)** (0.31)* 
Over-Identification Test 
 (Chi-sq p-value) 
0.891 0.252 0.183 0.904 
Number of observations 
 
2,873 2,873 2,873 2,873 
  Note: All regressions include household and village level characteristics and village fixed-effects.  
            The standard errors are in parenthesis, with significance ***-at 1%, **- at 5% and *- at 10% 
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 Table 2.6. Effect of exogenous explanatory variables on Self-employment Profit (Yearly) 
Variable Estimate Std Error 
Household Characteristcs   
Education ratio (female/male) 302.02          (467.00) 
Highest grade completed by household (HH) head 296.46 (24.35)*** 
Household land (in decimal) 140.18 (4.26)*** 
Number of people in HH 1383.30 (203.63)*** 
Religion (1 if muslim) 187.59   (116.88) 
Duration of the self-employment 570.50           (15.60)*** 
Residence in a micro-credit village 242.76    (246.00) 
# of female age 10-20 -1250.18   (1043.99) 
# of female age 20-30 -226.17    (187.11) 
# of female age 30-40 -248.26      (143.16)* 
# of female age 40-50 1224.10 (401.90)*** 
# of female age 50-60 288.59    (328.50) 
# of female over 60 -1154.92 (1277.30) 
# of male age 10-20 -1353.14        (627.70)** 
# of male age 20-30 -368.00         (260.46) 
# of male age 30-40 442.56        (198.24)** 
# of male age 40-50 1128.81 (319.33)*** 
# of male age 50-60 -522.02       (251.41)** 
# of male over 60  -990.12 (255.06)*** 
# of girls under 10 -1299.29 (219.93)*** 
# of boys under 10 -1332.55 (231.16)*** 
   
Village level variables   
Price of rice (per kg) 330.97 (109.54)*** 
Price of mustard oil (per kg) 232.91       (120.24)** 
Price of egg (4-count) 435.71       (228.95)** 
Price of milk  (kg/litre) 359.88           (76.86)*** 
Price of potato (per kg) 639.36        (294.55)** 
Price of flour  (per kg) 102.43          (45.93)** 
Price of Sugar  (per kg) 51.08      (56.57) 
Price of onion  (per kg) 271.22    (317.33) 
Price of garlic  (per kg) 119.27    (101.64) 
Price of turmeric  (per kg) -85.80      (60.21) 
Price of salt  (per kg) 33.56      (25.42) 
Price of chicken   (per kg) 353.29        (164.32)** 
Price of beef  (per kg) -210.03     (119.33)* 
Price of soap (per bar) 63.27     (70.01) 
Price of tobacco (per pack)  78.44         (103.54) 
Nearest distance to the market (km) -197.85 (33.65)*** 
Nearest distance to the shop (km) -235.60 (49.24)*** 
Nearest distance to the weekly market (km) -415.00 (56.13)*** 
  Note: All regressions include village fixed-effects.  




The Effect of Gender-Based Returns
to Borrowing on Intra-Household
Resource Allocation in Rural
Bangladesh
3.1 Introduction
Over the past decade and a half, micro-credit programs have been increasingly target-
ing women in rural Bangladesh. These programs distribute collateral free and low cost
microloans to the very poor under a group-based system.1 On global scale, the number
of women reached has increased from 10.9 million in 1999 to 79 million in 2007. Women
1The very poor are defined by World Bank as those living below a $1 a day, or in the case of
micro-credit programs, those with less than half acre of land.
make up 85% of the clientele for these programs.2 However, the economic impact of the
programs has failed to improve with increased number of women in the program. On
average, women’s businesses yield lower profits than do men’s businesses. The type of
business a woman can undertake is often limited, given the conservative view toward
women arising from social and religious norms. Unable to travel outside, women gen-
erally tend to invest in safer and home-based businesses. Therefore, an evaluation of
the economic impact of microcredit programs may reveal that the loans are not cost-
effective. If one hundred dollar given to men yields higher profit than one hundred dollar
given to women, it may be better to target men instead of women. However, researchers
should consider the social and development impact of microcredit programs as well.
The programs increase a woman’s income earning opportunity and income, which can
increase her bargaining power within the household. The social impact of the programs
may compensate for the low economic impact to make these programs cost-effective and
expand membership to women.
In this paper, I estimate the differential impact of returns to women’s and men’s
borrowing from micro-credit programs on intra-household resource allocation. From the
perspective of policy makers, analysis of intra-household resource allocation is impor-
tant. Individuals’ well-being may be influenced by the way money is injected into the
household. Ten dollars allotted to the male head of household may have different effects
on child health, labor, education and on tobacco and alcohol purchases than the same
amount allotted to his wife (Kanbur and Haddad, 1994). Moreover, different individuals
2Daley-Harris, Sam (2007), “State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2007”.
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may have different standard of living within the same household. Some households with
average per capita income above the poverty line may have members whose standard
of living is below the poverty line due to inequality in resource allocation (Haddad and
Kanbur, 1990). These issues are interesting and important when studied in terms of
husbands and wives in rural areas of developing countries such as Bangladesh where
women are usually disempowered and lack formal labor market opportunities.3 Under
these circumstances, programs such as microcredit that target women may improve their
standard of living by increasing their bargaining power so that allocation of resources are
in favor of them. Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (2002) and Lundberg, Pollack,
and Wales (1997) find that children’s education and health improve and expenditure
on child clothing increases when the mother’s non-labor income or assets increase or
when the mother is the welfare recipient. Thus, examining intra-household allocation of
resources may reveal unanticipated consequences.
I measure intra-household resource allocation by the gender-oriented expenditure
patterns of rural households in Bangladesh. A finding that an increase in female returns
to borrowing leads to allocation of resources that is relatively skewed toward the goods
that are of primary interest to her would offer evidence of empowerment or increased
bargaining power. The difference in resource allocation would result from the increase
in female income, which depends on her labor inputs. Thus, her bargaining power is
determined endogenously because it is now a function of her labor income. Past studies
3Women’s labor force is not institutionalized. In rural areas of the country, women may work outside
the household informally for irregular hours with no benefits.
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have treated the determinants of bargaining power as exogenous. This paper offers a
theoretical model that allows for the endogenous determinants of the power to include
choice variables. Thus, it adds to the bargaining literature.
In addition, most micro-credit studies examine the impact of program participation
or loan amount. I estimate the social impact of returns to borrowing on resource allo-
cation, as differentiated by the gender of the borrower. The return to borrowing is the
net income or profit a household receives from a business that was primarily funded by
micro-credit loans. When the primary borrower is female, I presume that the income
is from her business and vice-versa for male borrower. Program participation or loans
without positive income may leave a household and the borrower worse off since he or
she has to repay the loan. This paper also estimates the effect of returns to borrow-
ing from different loan sources, namely- micro-credit and non-micro sources. To my
knowledge, no other papers have examined different loan sources. Finally, in contrast
to the previous literature discussed in the next section which relies on ordinary least
squares estimation, I use instrumental variable estimation method with selection and
fixed effect to address endogeneity of returns to borrowing and gender of the borrower
due to unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection, and non-random program placement.
I rely on variations in distance to the lender and interest rate, time variant village-level
variables, and gender-restrictions placed by the programs, as well as functional forms
to identify the impact of returns to borrowing on intra-household resource allocation by
the gender of the borrower.
I use a survey from Bangladesh Institute of Development Study of 1991 and 1998
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(BIDS) and find that the return or profit is spent differently depending on the gender of
the borrower. The return from micro-credit borrowing increases consumption of goods
that are more valuable to women when a woman borrows. In contrast, when a man
borrows, the return lowers consumption of goods valuable to women and increases con-
sumptions of goods valuable to men. When differentiated by the source of borrowing,
micro borrowing leads to greater allocation of income toward women’s goods than non-
micro borrowing. I also find that income from different sources, such as income from
business versus income from employment activity or unearned income, is spent differ-
ently. This suggests that households do not pool their income. I also use alternative
measures of empowerment. These include indices on a woman’s decision making ability
and mobility. I find that return from micro-credit borrowing improves women’s empow-
erment. Moreover, female returns to borrowing lead to women taking greater role in
major economic and non-economic household decisions. The female returns also have
a positive effect on physical mobility. In contrast, male returns to borrowing lead to
women losing their roles in decision making.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Sources of loan
Micro-credit programs have become a central part of poverty alleviation strategies in
rural Bangladesh. The main purpose of these programs is to provide small and low cost
loans to the poor who may have little or no collateral. These loans either supplement or
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serve as the sole source of funds needed to start self-employment activities. Credit pro-
grams identify the poor on the basis of land ownership; only those owning fewer than half
an acre of cultivable land are eligible to borrow from these programs. Thus, if land own-
ership proxies for wealth, richer households are ineligible to borrow. However, this land
restriction is often not enforced, which creates some estimation problems discussed later.
The programs disburse loans under a group-based scheme with each group consisting of
five to seven members who self-select into the group. If one member defaults on his loan,
then all members of the group lose access to loans in the future. Naturally, this scheme
facilitates peer monitoring and group liability which ensure repayment through group
pressure, replace the need for collateral, and reduce the administrative costs associated
with collateral.
Individuals can also borrow from private non-micro sources such as commercial
banks, family and friends, and local money lenders. Indeed, these are the only borrowing
options available for people who are ineligible to borrow from micro-credit programs.
However, even those who are eligible for micro-credit occasionally choose to borrow
from other sources. I examine the effect of men’s and women’s business returns from
investments of loans from non-micro sources as well as those from micro-credit programs
on household allocation. This comparison is important since there are structural dif-
ferences in these two sources of borrowing. While micro-credit programs mainly target
women, non-micro lenders are gender neutral. In addition, micro-credit programs lend
under group contracts while non-micro lenders lend under an individual contract, where
only the borrower is liable for his or her loans. The latter requires collateral and those
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with less collateral pay a higher interest rate. In my data, the average interest rate is
18% for micro loans and 37% for non-micro loans. However, time costs may be higher
for micro loans, which often require a training period and regular attendance to group
meetings. The micro loans also require repayment in weekly installments. In contrast,
non-micro loans are repaid monthly. Micro-credit programs have mandatory provisions
for savings and offer social development services such as paralegal, vocational, and busi-
ness training, technical advice, access to inputs, informal primary education, and health
and family planning facilities. These social services are not available with non-micro
loans. These differences allow me to determine how the effect of returns to borrowing
on women’s empowerment depends upon the sources of borrowing.
3.2.2 Discussion of Intra-household resource allocation
There have been considerable debate and conflict over the notion of treating household
as a single unit, where preferences are aggregated, or as a collection of individuals with
different preferences. The traditional approach assumes that a household behaves as a
single decision-making unit. Thus, given a household budget constraint, one can derive
household demands by maximizing household preferences. This refers to the unitary
model 4. Paul Samuelson and Gary Becker were among the first to provide justification
for this type of model. Samuelson (1956) sets structure on the household decision-
making process such that the household utility function collapses to a unitary one, i.e.
in which preferences and resources are aggregated. He assumes a weakly separable
4Other names have been proposed: benevolent dictator model etc
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household utility function as a function of individual utility functions or subutilities.
This aggregation would be achieved by consensus among household members, although
he never discusses how this consensus maybe reached. Becker (1974, 1981) uses a similar
approach. However, he suggests there be a benevolent dictator or head in the family
who takes other members’ preferences into account and allocates resources accordingly.
In his ‘rotten kid theorem’, he posits that any one member will not try to gain at the
expense of the benefactor or any other members in fear that the benefactor will lower
his transfer to that member by more than the potential gain the member can achieve.
Ergo, no member will behave rottenly and the preferences of the head will represent the
preferences of the household.
Formally, a household with two partners or two working-age adults will maximize
the aggregate welfare function similar to Bergson-Samuelson welfare function
W = W [Um(X, l;µ), (Uf (X, l;µ)] (3.1)
where Um is the male partner’s utility and Uf is the female partner’s utility that are
strongly quasi-concave, increasing, and twice continuously differentiable functions in
their arguments. These include household consumption vector X = (x1, , xn)
′ and leisure
l = (lm, lf )
′. Finally, µ is the household specific heterogeneity. Household resource
constraint can be shown through a budget constraint:
P ′X +Wmlm +Wf lf ≤ Ym + Yf + Yh +WmT +WfT (3.2)
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where P = (P1, , Pn)
′ is the price vector, Wi and Yi are the wage rate and nonlabor
income for individual i, respectively, Yh is the total household nonlabor income that
cannot be assigned to any member, and T is the total time endowment.
The unitary model of the household may have two different interpretations. The sim-
plest one implicitly assumes that individuals have equivalent preferences. This implies
that the sub-utility functions in (1) are identical. Another interpretation is that of the
benevolent head expounded by Becker in which one individual makes all the resource
allocation decisions. In this case, the aggregate welfare function W (.) represents the
utility of that member where he assigns zero weights to all but own-utility function.
Consequently, heterogeneity in preferences would not affect resource allocation and thus
household demands would depend on the total household income, not individual income.
Then maximizing (1) subject to (2) will result in n+2 differentiable Marshallian demand
functions for goods and labor supply:5
X˜ = X(Yt +WmT +WfT, P˜ ) (3.3)
where X˜ = (X ′, l′) denotes consumption and leisure bundles and P˜ = (P ′,Wm,Wf ) is
the price vector. Yt = Ym + Yf + Yh is the aggregate nonlabor income. It is important
to note that the unitary model implies ‘income pooling hypothesis’ where individual
5The demand functions must satisfy i) Walrus’ law ii) homogeneity iii) slutsky symmetry, and iv)
negative semidefiniteness. However, empirically, only walrus’ law has been proven. The other three re-
strictions have been rejected repeatedly in various empirical studies. See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),
Blundell (1988), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998]) etc. for further discussion.
However, these rejections have been attributed to data and specification problems or functional form
rather than erroneous theory of consumer behavior
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nonlabor income are pooled into Yt. This asserts that the source of the income does not
affect intra-household resource allocation problem, i.e. changes in different income have
the same effect on household demands : dX/dYm = dX/dYf = dX/dYh. This assertion,
along with equality of cross-substitution effects on labor supply , has been strongly
rejected in various empirical studies (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974; Bourguignon
et al., 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Lundberg et al., 1997;
Thomas, (1990, 1993) among many others).
As an alternative to the unitary model, two other approaches have been proposed
that take into account the individual role in household decision-making, i.e. demands,
with heterogeneous preferences. The first of these approaches models household behav-
ior in a non-cooperative framework (see, e.g., Ashworth and Ulph, 1981; Ulph, 1988;
Carter and Katz, 1997; Lundberg and Pollack, 1993; Browning, 2000; and Chen and
Woolley, 2001). This framework assumes that individuals cannot enter into binding and
enforceable contract and thus maximize their utility, taking actions of other members’
as given. This Nash equilibrium results in more restrictions on household behavior than
the unitary approach and suboptimal or Pareto inefficient resource allocation. The sec-
ond approach presents a cooperative framework with cooperative game theory concepts
and axiomatic bargaining theories. Household members cooperate with each other to
divide the gains from living together, i.e. gains from cooperation, and a Pareto efficient
allocation is obtained depending on the bargaining power of the household members.
Thus, this type of model imposes more structure on the household allocation process.
Manser and Brown (1980) consider the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions to
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derive the implications on intrahousehold resource allocation, while Bjorn and Vuong
(1985) (cited in Thomas, 1993) consider a Stackleberg concept. McElroy and Horney
(1981) focus on Nash bargaining solution to derive conditions for Nash demand system
that collapse to traditional unitary model. In their model, the household maximizes
the utilities less the threat-point utility, which is the highest utility a member would
get if he or she withdraws from the household. Therefore, in a two person setting, the
household utility if given by the following “utility-gain product function”:
N = [Um(X, l)− Vm(P˜m, Ym;α)][Uf (X, l)− Vf (P˜f , Yf ;α)] (3.4)
where Vk represents the threat point utility. Therefore, household maximizes the product
of the gains from marriage. The α are the relevant shift parameter or the “extra-
environmental parameters” (EEPs). These are the changes in the opportunities outside
marriage such as changes in divorce and alimony laws, sex ratio, assets at marriage,
parental income, or income opportunities in developing countries. Any changes in alpha
would affect the threat point and thus would shift the bargaining power of the individual
within marriage, where the threat is dissolution of marriage. The household commodity
and leisure demand functions are obtained by maximizing (4) subject to (2) with respect
to X˜:
X˜ = X(Ym, Yf , P˜ ) (3.5)
A criticism of this approach is the imposition of specific structure on allocation decisions
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which are based on the assumed threat point. Since a particular bargaining concept has
to be chosen to model household behavior, if the empirical results are rejected, then
it is impossible to determine whether the particular choice itself or the bargaining set-
ting is rejected (Vermeulen, 2002). Therefore, Chiappori (1988a, 1992) and Apps and
Recs (1988) suggest an alternative model of collective framework. According to this
framework, household utility is defined as the weighted sum of the utilities of individ-
ual members in the households. These Pareto weights can be interpreted as proxies
for bargaining power for each individual in the household. The only assumption of the
collective model is that the solution to the household allocation process is Pareto effi-
cient. There is no restriction on which point will be chosen on the Pareto frontier by
the household. Since so little structure is imposed, the model has testable restrictions.
Numerous studies have applied the bargaining theories for empirical tests in an
attempt to disprove the unitary model. Bourguignon et al. (1993) have rejected the
income pooling hypothesis to find that the share of husbands’ and wives’ own income
affects the consumption structure within the household significantly. Lundberg et al.
(1997) use the transfer of child allowances from men to women in the U.K. in the late
1970s and find that such a transfer increases women’s and children’s clothing expenditure
relative to that of men’s. Thomas et al. (2002) and Quisumbing and Briere (2000)
find that mothers with more assets currently or at marriage (as indications of more
power) devote more resources toward their children’s clothing, education, and health
than do fathers. Other empirical evidences suggest that households in which women have
higher levels of non-labor income have healthier children, conditional on total income
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(Thomas,1990; Schultz, 1990; Duﬄo, 2003). Using Brazilian budget data, Thomas
(1993) finds that a higher income ratio of women to men results in less spending on food
but more spending on human capital such as health and education, as well as leisure
activities such as recreation. These tests of the income pooling hypothesis provide
compelling evidence to reject the traditional unitary model. In addition, improving
the status of women in households benefits children, and thus, justifies many social
programs’ practice of targeting women.
One limitation to these household bargaining models and the empirical studies is that
they assume the bargaining power or Pareto weight is determined only by exogenous
factors. Indeed, this assumption is necessary for the Pareto efficiency. However, in
reality, the bargaining power of a woman need not depend on exogenous parameters.
Consider a household with two members- a husband and wife- and define the Pareto
weight of the wife as µ(Z) in [0,1].6 In the traditional collective model, Z denotes a set of
variables exogenous to the household. Some examples include female assets, non-labor
income, changes in the divorce law, and the sex ratio. However, Basu (2001) criticizes
the exogeneity assumption and argues that µ may depend on the households’ choice
variables. For example, the share of the household income earned by the woman would
certainly influence her power over resource allocation. This share is endogenous since
it depends on her labor supply, which is determined within the model. However, when
using endogenous bargaining parameters, Z, any solutions to these models would not be
6Thus, the husband’s bargaining or Pareto weight is given by 1 − µ(Z). This also represents the
balance of power in the household.
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Pareto optimal. In this paper, I argue that returns to borrowing (profit) will increase a
woman’s bargaining power or empowerment when the gender of the borrower is female,
as evidenced from increased allocation of income toward female-dominant goods such
as women’s clothing and expenditures on children. Thus, the determinant of power is
earned income, which is endogenous because it depends on her choice of labor supply or
time investment into the business. One of the contributions of this paper is a two-stage
model within a dynamic framework that allows the determinants of bargaining power,
Z, to be endogenous. In this study, the Z is the male or female return to borrowing
from either micro-credit source or non-micro sources.
Over the past decade, there have been some household level studies of micro-credit
programs. The critiques of micro-credit programs claim that the loans are often con-
trolled by men, regardless of the gender of the borrower. If this is true, the program
should not increase a woman’s bargaining power and might actually decrease it, because
the woman would still be responsible for repayment. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) find a
negative relationship between micro-credit and women’s empowerment in research that
focuses on who controls the loan. They find that a significant portion of married women
(as compared to widows) have lost control of the loans, while some have no information
as to the usage of the loans. In contrast, Hashemi et. al. (1996) show a positive relation-
ship between credit participation by women and women’s empowerment in Bangladesh
in terms of increased ownership of assets, an expanded ability to make decisions and
purchases, and decreased domestic violence. Other studies find a positive effect of micro-
credit participation on contraceptive use (Schuler and Hashemi, 1994; Schuler et. al,
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1997), while Pitt et al. (1999) fail to find any significant effect. Most of these studies.
however, do not correct for nonrandom program placement and self-selection into the
program. Pitt and Khandker (1998) use fixed effects and a quasi-experimental design
to control for heterogeneity and selection bias at both the individual and village level.
They find that the programs have a greater impact on total household expenditures,
savings, and assets when females borrow than when males borrow.
However, these studies do not examine intra-household resource allocation or the
power dynamic within a household due to credit program participation or borrowing
from non-micro sources. The current paper provides an alternative method by which to
evaluate these credit programs and to compare the social or empowerment effects of these
programs to alternative sources of borrowing. I do so by examining the differential effects
that male and female returns to borrowing have on household expenditure patterns. In
addition, previous studies examine the financial or social impact of micro-credit program
participation or loan amount. Neither reveals the impacts accurately since they do not
take into account the interest rate and other monetary costs of borrowing. This is true
especially if the borrower invests the loan into income-generating activities. Consider
a case where the business income generated fails to cover the cost of the outstanding
loan. In this case, the borrower may actually be worse off. Since all loans from micro-
credit institutions are to be repaid within a year in weekly installments, the actual
income that the household receives is the profit from the business less these extra costs.
Thus, if these costs are not taken into account and the loan amount is used to study a
program’s impact, then an analysis of these programs may attribute undue benefit to
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the loan amount. In addition, program participation without positive income may leave
a household and the borrower worse off since she must now depend on her husband
to repay the loan. In this case, an analysis of the program’s impact using program
participation may show worsening of balance of power and disempowerment of women
when in fact it is the unsuccessful business venture that worsens the position of the
woman in the household. To correct for these misinterpretations, the present study uses
the income generated from the business less the cost of borrowing, to be defined as
profit or returns to borrowing from micro or non-micro sources for the remainder of this
document.
3.3 Theoretical framework
The bargaining models discussed in the previous section assume that the bargaining
power of spouses is determined by exogenous factors in a static framework. In this sec-
tion, I present a dynamic model that explains why and how intra-household bargaining
influences resource allocation in the presence of endogenous parameters in a variable
representing bargaining power. It is assumed that the relative bargaining power of a
woman depends on her share of total household income when she participates in income-
generating activities. Specifically, a higher share of total income would lead to greater
power in household resource allocation.
Since the main issue in this paper is how profit, as it differs by the gender of the bor-
rower, affects the allocation in the household, the consumption, leisure, borrowing, and
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investment decisions should be modeled under a dynamic framework. Since bargaining
power is endogenously determined according to individuals’ labor income, individuals
take into account how their labor-supply decisions and income affect consumption deci-
sions through the bargaining process. Thus, the household decision can be modeled as a
two-stage process within each period of the dynamic model. In the first stage, individu-
als decide on matters that influence income and bargaining power. After the realization
of income and bargaining power, they make Pareto optimal consumption decisions in
the second stage, taking as given the labor, borrowing, and investment decisions from
the first stage.7 The model is useful to explain why people borrow and how that affects
other decisions. However, a dynamic estimation model is not necessary for estimation
of the relationships of input in this research. The estimation is attempted using a more
tractable static framework. Essentially, I analyze a single period of a dynamic scenario.
The predictions on consumption in any period will not change as a result of the dy-
namic relationship since when decisions regarding consumption are made, the income
and bargaining power variables have already been determined.
3.3.1 Utility
In the theoretical model below, I consider a household with two adult members -
a husband and a wife - and with caring preferences, i.e. each cares about the other’s
7Uncertainty of income may come from production. This is one example of uncertainty. There are
many other uncertainties or shocks that would result in a two-stage decision making process.
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consumption and leisure levels (Becker, 1981)8. Each individual in the household derives
utility from consumption, Ct, and leisure, lt. The decision process starts after marriage
and ends at T , so the household plans over a horizon of fixed length T . Each period is
assumed to be a year. The utility function for individual i, (i=h for husband, i=w for
wife), is
Uit = U(Cht, Cwt, lht, lwt;Dt) (3.6)
where Cht and Cwt are the respective consumption vectors for the husband and the
wife and lht and lwt are their leisure consumptions. Dt is a vector of preference shifters
including demographic characteristics. Each utility function is increasing in both the
husband’s and wife’s consumption and leisure but the individuals do not necessarily
have the same marginal utility for the spouses’ goods as for their own goods.
3.3.2 Constraints
The household is allowed to operate a self-employment activity which generates in-
come. The individuals allocate their time among leisure, self-employment activity, and
employment wage-earning activity. The income from self-employment is uncertain and
depends on production shocks. Finally, a household allocates self-employment and la-
bor income plus new borrowing among consumption goods of both spouses, debt, and
8Note that an egoistic preference would include only own level of demand in the utility function
(Chiappori, 1988a)
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investments. The budget constraints are as follows:
PhtCht + PwtCwt = whtLht + P
Q
t Qt − dt + bt − P kt It (3.7)
Qt = f(Kt, St, t) (3.8)
Lht + lht + Sht = H (3.9)
lwt + Swt = H (3.10)
dt =

Mt−1(1 + r)bt−1 if bt = 0
(12−Mt)(1 + r)bt if bt > 0
(3.11)
where f(.) is a strictly concave production function; Qt represents production; Kt is
the capital stock; It is gross investment; bt is the amount of borrowing and dt is debt
liability; Lht is time spent in wage earning for the husband, and Sht and Swt are time




t , and r are the
market wage, production good price, capital good price, and interest rate, respectively.
Lastly, Mt is the month the household initiated the loan.
Equation (7) defines total household consumption in period t to be earnings from
wage employment and self-employment plus any borrowing less the debt liability and
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total investment expenditure. The production level in equation (8) is determined by
capital and labor and t reflects any shock to production and thus profit. The shock, t,
is assumed to be well-behaved and normally distributed and given by f(t) with mean
0 and variance, σ. Equations (9) and (10) show the time allocations for the husband
and the wife. The husband divides his total time endowment, H, among time spent on
wage earning, self-employment, and leisure. However, the wife divides her time between
the latter two and I assume few women work outside the home. Finally, equation (11)
shows the amount of household debt liability. The loans are yearly, with installments
paid out weekly. Therefore, the households that borrowed in the previous period or
current period will have a partial amount of the loan to repay in the current period.
3.3.3 Optimization problem in the second stage conditional on
first stage decisions
The problem of each individual can be written in recursive form. The state variables
at time t are (Kt−1, dt−1,Mt−1, Dt) = Zt. The choice variables at time t can be catego-
rized into two types. In the first stage, a household chooses (Lht, Sht, Swt, bt, It) = A1t.
In the second stage, household chooses consumption, (Cht, Cwt) = A2t, where Cit is a
consumption vector. I start with the last period utility for the household, UHT , defined
as the weighted utility of the husband and the wife.
UH(A1T , A2T ) = µwTUwT (A1T , A2T ) + (1− µwT )UhT (A1T , A2T ) (3.12)
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The weight is given by µwt and represents the bargaining power of the wife. This
depends on distribution factors or choices. In this paper, the factors that affect µwt
are the returns to borrowing or the self-employment profit from business operated by
the husband or the wife. Of course, this in turn depends on the time investment and
borrowing decisions, which are component of A1t. The decision making process is static
at T . At this point, the couple may decide to bequeath all household matter to their
eldest son and his wife. Without any subsequent period, the last period value function
in stage two is
V S2T (ZT , A1T , T ) = max
A2T
{
UH(A1T , A2T )
}
(3.13)
subject to constraints (7)-(11). Let Â2T (ZT , A1T , T ) denote the optimal allocation.
Given the above, the last period value function in stage one is





T (ZT , A1T , T )
}
(3.14)
subject to constraints (7)-(11), where the consumption vector in the last period is
Â2T (ZT , A1T , T ). Having derived the value function of the last period, I can define
the value functions for period T − 1 and period t. The value function of stage two in
period t is
V S2t (Zt, A1t, t, Zt) = max
A2t
[






subject to constraints (7)-(11). Given above, the value function in stage 1 of period t is





t (Zt, A1t, t, Zt+1)
}
(3.16)
subject to constraints (7)-(11), where the consumption vector is Â2t(Zt, A1t, t, Zt+1).
The optimal decision rules for consumptions are given by Cht(Zt, µwt, Pt), Cwt(Zt, µwt, Pt)




t , wht, δ).
In summary, the household engages in a sequential decision making process within
each period of the dynamic model. First, the husband and wife choose (i) how to allocate
their time, and (ii) how much to borrow and invest. Given these decisions, income and
bargaining power are realized. In the second stage, the household selects its consumption
bundle. Consequently, I can analyze the second stage of the per period game since I am
interested in how borrowing and returns to borrowing affect intra-household resource
allocation. By the time the household makes these consumption decisions, anything that
affects income and bargaining power is set from the first stage. Therefore, consumption
decisions would depend on exogenous parameters such as prices, state variables, income,
and bargaining power. The returns to borrowing or the self-employment profit from a
business, funds for which came from credit programs, determine the bargaining power in
this paper. Via changes in µt, increased returns to borrowing may have different effects
on consumptions depending on the gender of the borrower. This paper examines whether
an increase in female returns increases consumption of the goods that are female-oriented
by more than a similar increase in male returns. A higher income should increase a
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female’s bargaining power and lead to greater allocation toward female-oriented goods.
This serves as evidence of female empowerment resulting from programs such as micro-
credit in rural areas that target women.
Lastly, it is important to note that in the model above, the individuals make decisions
cooperatively in both stages, which need not be true. Indeed, I do not wish to make
any assumption about how the household makes first stage decision. To accommodate
this, I can replace V S2t in equation (16) with an agnostic function Wt(.). Thus, equation
(16) may be written as
V S1t (Zt) = max
A1t
{





The last term in equation (17) does not further encumber the model since no component
of A2t affects Zt+1. The implication for stage two remains unchanged. The consumption
choices will be influenced by only prices, household income, and bargaining power, µt.
3.4 Empirical model
3.4.1 Empirical Specification
I use the theoretical model to motivate my empirical specification. As discussed
in the previous section, theory implies that consumption decisions would depend on
prices of goods, household characteristics, income, and bargaining power. The empirical
model presented below can be interpreted as a linear approximation to the consumption
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decisions. Thus, for a household i in village j in period t for good n, the specification is
LogXijnt = Hijtλn + logIijtλ1n + logNijtλ2n + logNijtGijtλ3n +Gijtλ4n + Vjλ5n + η
X
ijnt(3.18)
Pijt = Hijtαp + Zijtpα1p + Vjα2p + ηijtp





ijt, Pijt = 1 if P
∗
ijt > 0




Xijnt household yearly expenditure on goods;
Hijt a vector of household and village characteristics;
Iijt household income from working in the labor market plus any other non-
labor income, including business profit;
Gijt dummy variable of whether the primary borrower is female. It equals 1
if the borrower is female;
Nijt returns to borrowing or the net profit from investment of the loans for
the current year;
Vj vector of village fixed effects;
Pijt 1 if the individual borrows, 0 otherwise;
ηXijnt ijn+vijnt, where ijn is household specific error and vijnt is iid error term.
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The consumption decisions of the household are a function of the household charac-
teristics, Hijt, such as education levels and ages of the head of the household and the
spouse, number of children and adults in different age category, religion, amount of land,
and number of years in business. The variable Hijt also includes village level prices.
In this paper, the returns to borrowing by the gender of the borrower determine
the bargaining power which affects intra-household resource allocation-measured by the
expenditure pattern, Xijnt. The returns to borrowing, Nijt, is the net profit from the
household business, the primary fund for which comes from micro-credit programs or
non-micro sources. It takes into account the cost of borrowing, namely the loan repay-
ment, interest and other transaction fees. Thus, Nijt is business revenue, Rijt, less the
cost of operation, Cijt, and cost of borrowing.
Nijt = Rijt − Cijt − (rbijt + Ft)Df (3.20)
The last part of the equation represents the cost of borrowing where bijt is the loan
amount, r is the interest rate of the loan, Ft is transaction costs. Finally, Df is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the household has yet to finish paying or have paid
back within the last 12 months and 0 otherwise. I assume that a borrowing household
has not finished paying if I observe it still paying or if it finished paying any time
within 12 months prior to the time of the survey. The reason for this distinction is that
household expenditures, business revenue, and cost are reported for the past 12 months
in the data. If a household had fully repaid the loan at least a year before the survey,
60
cost of borrowing is zero. However, if a household paid its loan anytime within the past
12 months, the effect of profit on consumption will be biased if it does not account for
the cost of borrowing.
Empirically, I identify the effect of male returns to borrowing through Nijt and female
returns to borrowing through the interaction between Nijt and borrower gender, Gijt.
One concern with defining male and female returns to borrowing this way is that they
may not reflect husband’s business earning and wife’s business earning, respectively.
Indeed what I would like to know is whether profit from a wife’s business is spent
differently than the profit from a husband’s business. Separate earning from husband’s
and wife’s businesses would be the ideal measures. However, I only observe if the
household owns any business, how that business is initially funded, and who is the
primary borrower. I do not observe to whom the business belongs. Figure 1(a) shows
the number of husbands and wives in alternative levels of daily self-employment hours
when the husband borrows. The number of men working longer is higher. In contrast,
figure 1(b) shows the numbers when the wife borrows. The number of women working
longer is higher than that of men. These figures show that women spent more time in
the business when they are the primary borrowers and vice-versa for men. Therefore, I
presume that if wife is the borrower, then profit comes from her business and if husband
is the borrower, then profit comes from his business. Consequently, the coefficient λ2
is the effect of husband’s business income or male returns to borrowing on household
allocation. And the coefficient λ3 is the effect of wife’s business income or female returns
to borrowing on household allocation.
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(a) male borrower (b) female borrower
Figure 3.1: Women’s and men’s self-employment hours and gender of the borrower
Another concern with male and female returns to borrowing is that they may pick
up income effect rather than bargaining or empowerment effect. I control for household
total income, which includes business profits, to isolate the income effect. If no other
effect but income effect exists, then the coefficient λ2 will not be statistically different
from zero. This also proves the income pooling hypothesis. However, a statistically
significant λ2 will show that different income sources have different effects on household
allocation and these differences are born from household members’ bargaining powers
that are determined by their income. The member that has more bargaining power will
be able to influence allocation in his or her favor. Therefore, the coefficients λ2 and λ3
provide the bargaining or empowerment effect of male and female returns to borrowing
on intra-household allocation.
3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
If there are unobservable (to the econometrician) household or individual specific
characteristics that affect resource allocation as well as decision to borrow, source of
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borrowing, gender of the borrower, and returns to borrowing, then estimation of the
expenditure equations using Ordinary Least Squares will result in biased estimates. For
example, a more savvy woman may earn higher returns to borrowing and also be able
to negotiate terms of her marriage that favor her. The effect of returns to borrowing
will be overstated. Or a woman who is more empowered maybe more likely to borrow
and start a business. Not accounting for this correlation would wrongly ascribe the part
of the shifts in allocation from this unobserved characteristic to just her borrowing and
result in an upward bias.
However, the selection bias can also go in the opposite direction. Micro-credit pro-
grams target poor households and women.9 If women from poorer households are likely
to be less empowered, it can result in a downward bias of the effect of gender of the
borrower on allocation. At the extreme, effective targeting of poorest women can create
an impression that women become less empowered when they borrow from micro-credit
programs or as their business income increases. Source of the loans may also be corre-
lated with unobserved characteristics. A woman who chooses to borrow from non-micro
sources such as commercial banks when they could have chosen from micro-credit banks
may be more empowered, shrewder, more intelligent, all of which will influence her abil-
ity to allocate resources in her favor. In such case, effect of returns to borrowing from
micro-credit may be biased downward. Moreover, measurement errors can also under-
state the effects. Finally, household preferences may influence both consumption and
9Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that poorer households are more likely to borrow from Grameen
Bank than their neighbors, conditional on observable characteristics and village of residence.
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labor decisions and thus labor income.
I address the potential endogeneity problem with an Instrumental Variable approach
using Two Stage Least Squares. I treat variables Nijt, Gijt, Iijt, and whether the loan is
from micro-credit program as endogenous.
In addition to selection bias, there exists a sample selection problem. I do not
observe Nij for households that do not borrow. To address sample selection of Nijt, I
estimate the main equation, Xijn, with selection. A selection equation of whether the
household selected into borrowing is estimated through the Probit estimation technique.
I construct the sample selection correction term- inverse mills ratio- from the predicted
probability, according to Heckman (1979), by using the following formula where φ(.) if




This sample selection term, Ψ, is included as an additional regressor in the main equation
(18). A significance test of the coefficient of Ψ will show if there is indeed sample
selection.
Another important source of bias is non-random program placement. Some micro-
credit programs target poorest, underserved villages. These villages may be more
parochial about treatment toward women and their roles. Failure to account for this
unobserved village characteristic would bias the empowerment effect downward. In con-
trast, other programs may locate in richer villages with better infrastructure; villages
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that may be more secular in their treatment toward women. This would lead to an
overestimation of the impact. The estimation strategy must control for village-specific
unobservables. I use a village Fixed Effect approach to address the bias due to non-
random program placement. All standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by
households.
3.4.3 Identification
I need to identify the selection equation as well as first stage equations. To identify
the former, I need a variable that is correlated with borrowing but uncorrelated with
returns to borrowing, Nij. I use distance to the lender as the instrument here. This
would likely affect whether the household borrows; the further one has to travel, the less
likely she may borrow. However, distance should not affect Nij. The square and cube
of distance to the lender are also used as explanatory variables.
To identify the first stage equations for Nijt, Gijt, Iijt, and whether the loan is from
micro-credit program, the main identification comes from the gender-based restriction
of the programs. Households are exogenously excluded through their residence in non-
program villages. Since men can join men only groups and women can join women only
groups, the gender-based restriction is enforceable and observable. Therefore, I use the
gender-based program design to identify the effects of the endogenous variables. There
are three different micro-credit programs (BRAC, BRDB, GB) and some villages where
only women can borrow from micro-credit and other villages where only a man can
borrow. The rest of the micro-credit villages allow both genders to borrow (see Table
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1.1). This leads to six gender- and program-specific dummy variables, disaggregated
by borrowing from the three different micro-credit programs and two gender-specific
dummy variables when examining borrowing from micro-credit. I define the gender
restriction by Zijk where
Zijk =

1 if village j has program s of gender k
0 otherwise s=GB, BRAC, BRDB and k=male, female
Therefore, the first set of instruments is interactions between Zijk and household
exogenous variables such as owned land and the age and education of the head of the
household. I use amount of land as an interaction because land-holdings proxy for
wealth. This term should identify the change in the effect of Nij as the household’s
wealth changes. Aside from the gender-restrictions, there may be a second reason a
household may have a female participant rather than a male participant. Men and
women on average face different wait times to obtain a loan. Men, on average, wait 14
weeks to access the loan while women wait 9 weeks. The borrowers also have to bear
the time cost of joining; they have to attend training and group meetings.
The interest rate and the distance to the lending institution serve as additional in-
struments. Distance to the lending institution may also determine whether a female
borrows or whether a household borrows from micro-credit. The borrowers were asked
the main reasons they decided to join the micro-credit program. 65% of the borrowers
replied that it is because the programs offered relatively cheaper credit; 20% said the
access to credit is easier. Another reason for participation in credit program is the lack
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of collateral. These answers suggest that interest rate and lender’s distance determine,
in part, whether the individuals borrow and from where they borrow and serve as initial
validation for the use of these instruments. Finally, I include some village level vari-
ables such as the nearest distance to the bank, bus stop, paved road, health facility,
high school, religious school, college, fertilizer shop, whether the village has electricity,
whether the buildings were made of corrugated iron sheet or brick, male wages, female
wages, and average male and female loans as instruments.
I present the descriptive statistics of all the instruments, differentiated by the gender
of the borrower in Table 3.1B. The table shows that there is statistically significant
variation in the household level instruments depending on the gender of the borrower.
As a check for validity of these instruments, I present selected results from the first stage
of the IV procedure, reduced form estimation of total expenditure, and the selection
equation in Table 3.4. The instruments have the expected signs in all columns. The
F-statistic from a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments can be excluded from
the estimation ranges from 13.78 to 152.62. These suggest that the instruments are
jointly powerful. When the main variables of interest are the empowerment indicators,
I use an additional set of instruments. The data contain information about access
to inter-household transfers which can influence the decision to borrow. These are
measured by the number of landed (one-half acre or more) or living relatives of the
head of the household and the head’s spouse. I use the head’s relatives as instruments
since the spouse’s relatives who are rich and live nearby may influence the empowerment
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indices.10 In total, there are fourteen such instruments. I estimate a reduced form for the
empowerment indicators and first stage of the IV procedure with these new instruments,
along with the previous instruements (results not shown). The results and F-statistics
maintain the instruments’ relevance.
3.5 Data: Construction of the major variables
3.5.1 Dependent variables
The survey asks about household expenditures on specific goods such as food, adult
clothing, children’s clothing, education, health, recreation, personal expenses, non-food
kitchen expenses, repairs on the house, etc. that the household incurred within the past
year. I calculate the food expenditure by adding all expenses on food items over the
past four months, three times a year. I also calculate expenses on men’s and women’s
clothing by multiplying the amount of these items purchased by their respective prices
which vary across villages. Only the first wave of the survey asks about the amount of
men’s and women’s clothing item purchased. I assign goods to different genders on the
basis of the findings from previous literature in section 2. Accordingly, female-oriented
expenditures are children’s clothing, education, health, women’s clothing, soap, and
kitchen goods. Male-oriented expenditures are recreational expenses, personal items,
men’s clothing, and household repairs. I do not assign expenditures such as adult
10These instruments become suspect if the household head’s wealthy relatives elevate their status in
the village, thereby restricting mobility of the women of the households for reasons of propriety. Since
mobility is one of the empowerment indicators, the instruments will no longer be valid.
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clothing and food. Table 3.2 shows the mean of these variables by the gender of the
borrower. Female-oriented expenditures are higher when females borrow. In contrast,
male-oriented expenditures are higher when males borrow. The last column reports
statistically significant differences of expenditures by the gender of the borrower.11
In addition to differential expenditure patterns to measure empowerment or alloca-
tion, another form of empowerment may be a woman’s ability to make major economic
and non-economic decisions, her mobility, etc. It is plausible that the ability to borrow
money on her own and earn income would influence these factors as well. Therefore, I
use these variables as alternative measures of empowerment, which could be influenced
by a woman’s borrowing opportunity and returns to borrowing. The second wave of
the survey asks the wives of the heads of the households who are between 15 and 60
years of age questions regarding mobility, economic and non-economic decision making
ability, legal and political awareness. I use their responses to create indices of the main
variables. Figure (2) presents the percentages of women with varying non-economic
decision making power or index when the wife borrows and when the husband borrows.
It shows that more women report higher decision making ability when they borrow. In
contrast, less women report higher ability to make decisions when their husbands bor-
row. Female borrowing is correlated with empowerment. The rest of the indices follow
a similar pattern. Appendix A explains the construction of these indices.
11In addition, when I differentiate expenditures by borrowing status and program villages, I find that
the borrowers and households in program villages have slightly higher expenditures than non-borrowers
and households in control villages, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of women with varying major
non-economic decision index and borrower’s gender
Figure 3.3: Women’s self-employment hours when
females borrow, by business type
3.5.2 Main independent variables
I calculate Nij by the formula given in equation (20). For borrowing households, it
is the revenue minus the cost of operating the business less interest payment and any
other fees associated with borrowing. For non-borrowers, it is missing. Households are
asked if and when they borrowed, the identity of the primary borrower, and the purpose
of borrowing. In the self-employment questionnaire, households were asked about the
type of business they operate and the length of time they have been operating it. I also
have the information on the primary source of funding for the business. Therefore, I can
match the year of operation for the business to the year of borrowing, for the business
which was funded primarily from borrowing loans. The revenue from this business for
the current year less the cost of operating, including the cost of borrowing is then defined
as the profit from a self-employment activity that was funded mainly by loans. In this
paper, these are defined as returns to borrowing from micro and non-micro sources.
Table 3.3 presents the summary description of profit for different groups and three
other endogenous variables: gender of the borrower, household total income, and whether
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the individual borrows from micro-credit programs. The average profit from Grameen
Bank is higher than BRAC and BRDB. This is not surprising since Grameen Bank
is bigger and dispenses larger loan amounts. The furthermore, the bank generally lo-
cates in villages with better infrastructure and higher income levels. The profit is also
higher for micro-borrowers when compared to non-micro borrowing. Male borrowers
have higher profit than female borrowers on average. One reason is that women tend to
be more risk averse in investments and are socially restricted in the range of businesses
they can operate. The credit amount borrowed is also higher for micro-credit than that
for non-micro lenders.
Household businesses are categorized into agricultural and non-agricultural enter-
prises. Agriculture includes farming, livestock rearing, nursery, sericulture, horticul-
ture, etc. Non-agriculture include services, transportation, construction, etc. Relatively
more men work in non-agriculture than women. This is not surprising since the non-
agricultural sector requires trades that are outside the household and in the market-
place. These businesses are more male-dominant. Interestingly, more women work in
these types of businesses when they are the primary borrowers. Figure (3) presents
the number of women with varying level of self-employment hours in either agricul-
ture or non-agriculture, conditional on female borrowing. It shows that more women
tend to work longer in non-agricultural businesses when they borrow. This suggests
that borrowing may influence switching. It increases the level of work and the range of
activities that a female can undertake. A Woman performing activities or working in
male-dominant businesses may itself enhance empowerment.
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Household income is the sum of total labor income of all members and unearned
income for households that do not borrow. For households that borrow, household
income includes business income. Three times a year every four months, the survey asks
respondents the number of days they spend working outside for wage during the past
four months, not including own business, and the pay they receive in a given day. I
calculate the yearly labor income by multiplying number of days with per-day earning
for all three segments and adding them. On average, household yearly income is TK
38,940
Land is defined as the amount of cultivable land that the household owns, which
includes all irrigated and non-irrigated land. Since the land eligibility restriction of the
credit programs is 0.5 acres or fewer, I exclude all households with more than 0.5 acres
of land to facilitate comparison between borrowers and non-borrowers in the treated and
control groups. One potential problem with such exclusion is that the land eligibility
criterion was not strictly enforced. Indeed, 25% of the program participants have more
than 0.5 acres of land. Thus, excluding these households may create selection problems.
After excluding all households with land greater than 0.5 acre, the sample is reduced to
2,873, of which 1,861 borrow. Of this, 1,263 borrow from micro-credit and 598 borrow
from non-micro lenders such as commercial banks, government, and informal money
lenders.
The wife’s education level is defined as the years of education household head’s wife
received and the ratio of education is derived from her education divided by the highest
level of education obtained by her husband. I also include household age categories,
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number of people, a survey time dummy, and village characteristics such as prices and
infrastructure. Table 3.1A reports the descriptive statistics of the household and vil-
lage level exogenous variables, differentiated by the gender of the borrower. Women
borrowers are relatively more educated than their husbands and more likely to live in
micro-credit villages. They are also from poorer and smaller households and less likely to
be muslims. The table shows that there is statistically significant variation in household
characteristics with the gender of the borrower.
3.6 Estimation Results
This paper examines the effect of male and female returns to borrowing on intra-
household resources allocation and how the effect differs when source of the loan varies.
I use a IV estimation approach with selection to control for endogeneity and sample
selection and village fixed effect to control for non-random program placement. I shall
refer to this approach as IV-FE.
I estimate a selection equation in which the choice is to borrow for investment into
self-employment activities. When asked about the use of their loans, some borrowers re-
port that they were borrowing for consumption purposes. However, I do not distinguish
among different uses of the loans as borrowers may not differentiate between consump-
tion and investment. The results are shown in the last column of Table 3.4. The interest
rate, distance to the lending institution, and village wages have negative effects on the
probability of borrowing. As wages increase, the opportunity cost of self-employment
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increases. An average amount of loans disbursed to men and women both have a pos-
itive effect on the probability of borrowing as does the availability of a micro-credit
program in the village where women are eligible to borrow. The presence of a program
that systematically targets women would likely ease social norms and constraints, al-
lowing women to borrow. The estimates are significantly different from zero. Household
size and education levels have a positive effect, while land has a negative effect on the
probability of borrowing.
3.6.1 Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on allocation
3.6.2 Borrowing from any sources
I estimate equation (18) using the IV-FE approach, where the main explanatory
variables are the profit from the business and its interaction with the gender of the
borrower. Thus, the coefficient of business profit is the effect of male returns to borrowing
and the coefficient of the interaction between profit and borrower gender is the effect
of female returns to borrowing. The dependent variables are yearly log expenditures
on different items. The profit and total household income are logged since they are
skewed to the right. However, about 17% of the households realize a negative profit;
the average at the 10th percentile is TK -4,868. I take account of these negative profits
by creating a new variable consisting of only the negative values and take the logarithm
of the absolute value. Table 3.5 presents results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and IV-FE estimations for household total expenditure and food expenditure. OLS
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underestimates the effects of male and female returns on both expenditures, although
the results are qualitatively similar. Both male and female returns have positive effect
on total and food expenditure, while the negative returns have a negative effect. In
addition, household total income has a positive impact on expenditures. The results
show the importance of taking into account unobserved heterogeneity and the bias it
causes.
Table 3.6 reports the IV-FE results in terms of elasticities for expenditures on dif-
ferent items. The first row reports the effect of positive male returns to borrowing on
expenditures. This effect is positive for total expenditure, adult and men’s clothing,
food, education, medicine, recreation, household repair, and personal items. This is not
surprising since men’s clothing, recreation, repair, and personal items may be deemed
male-oriented, or goods that provide more value to men than to women. Therefore,
when a man, who is usually the head of the household, borrows, the business income or
male returns to borrowing is allocated toward items that are more valued by him. In
particular, a 10% increase in positive profit results in 5.7% increase in total expenditure.
In the level scale, this is an increase of TK 820. Expenditure on men’s clothing increases
by 3% or TK 6, food by 2.3% or TK 226, education by 5.6% or TK 51, medicine by
5.4% or TK 20, recreation by 1.1% or TK 1, and personal items by 11.7% or TK 25.12
In contrast, when a woman- usually the spouse of the head of the household- borrows,
profit has a downward or negative effect on male-oriented items. The expenditure on
12I calculate the level effects by using retransformation of the log model and a smearing factor.
Retransformation of the log model yields Y = eβlnX+. The marginal effect dYdX =
βx
X E(Y ) where
E(Y ) = eβˆlnX+.5σˆ
2(x).
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recreation is reduced by 1% and personal items by 0.8%, while expenditure on men’s
clothing still increases by 0.6%. This suggests that while a portion of female income is
still allocated toward “male” items, it is smaller than one from his income (3% com-
pared to 0.6%). Female returns to borrowing lowers “frivolous” consumption such as
recreation. Indeed, the banks urge women to keep “empty” expenditures low and save
more. Finally, when a female borrows, positive profit leads to more spending in total,
food, education, and medicine than when a man borrows. These effects are significantly
different than zero.
Women’s clothing, soap, kitchen items, and child clothing are items that are more
valuable to women than to men. Therefore, any income earned by a man may be allo-
cated away from these goods whereas any income earned by a woman may be allocated
toward them. The latter case would suggest an increase in bargaining power of the
woman. A 10% increase in men’s profit decreases expenditures on women’s clothing by
5.3%, soap by 5.2%, kitchen items by 4.5%, and children’s clothing by 5.5%. A 10% in
women’s profit leads to an increase in women’s clothing by 3.3% and kitchen by 2.3%
but a decrease in children’s clothing by 1.3% and soap expenses by 0.6%. The decrease
in latter two items is much more favorable allocation than when a man borrows. While
a woman may not be able to increase allocation of income for some of her goods, she
is able to dampen the level of resources that are allocated away from the goods more
valuable to her.
The table also presents results for the negative profit in rows 3 and 4. Aside from
accommodating log-transformation, the negative profit may also reveal household risk
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aversion. For example, a 10% increase in men’s returns or business income leads to a
5.7% increase in total expenditure. However, a 10% increase in negative profit leads
to a 8.1% decrease in total expenditure. This shows that households, in general, are
risk averse. Women’s negative returns or business income exacerbates the negative
effect and leads to a 11.5% decrease in total expenditure. Similar results are seen for
adult’s, women’s, and children’s clothing expenditures. Increase in men’s negative profit
increases recreation and personal spending. These reflect small expenditures. Therefore,
when a business suffers a loss, households may be more likely to spend on items that
cost less but bring immediate satisfaction. Increase in women’s negative business income
increases spending on recreation but by less than the increase from men’s income. In
contrast, men’s negative income lowers expenditure on women’s clothing by 4.9% and
women’s negative income lowers it further by 11.6%. A 10% increase in women’s negative
income also reduces education expenditure by 74.3%. These suggest that women lose
more allocation power than men do when they are faced with reduced income from an
already negative income. In bad economic times, goods that are first to cut back are
the ones that are more valuable to women.
Household income has a positive and statistically significant effect on most types
of expenditure. The effect ranges from a 0.6% to 5.4% increase when income increases
by 10%. Income, however, has a negative impact on kitchen and soap expenditures.
Household income includes business profit. Since women generally do not work outside
the household, only male borrowing means the total income may comprise mostly of
male income, increase in which leads to allocation away from female oriented items.
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Nevertheless, the statistically significant effect of household total income, in addition to
the effects of male or female returns, proves that households do not pool their income.
The source of income influences its allocation.
Another interesting result is for women’s education relative to men’s. It has a pos-
itive and statistically significant effect on education, food, medicine, soap, and kitchen
expenditure. This ratio is also significant and negative for children’s, men’s and women’s
clothing. A woman with relatively more education will likely shift her priorities toward
investment in her children and their future. Moreover, this ratio can be regarded as
another factor that influences bargaining power within a household. Lastly, I include
the ratios of women’s clothing to that of men’s. This represents the spending on goods
more valuable to women relative to spending on goods more valuable to men. The
results show that men would spend more on their goods relative to women’s goods as
male returns increase.
The last row of the table presents the p-values from a Sargan-Hansan test of over-
identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of this test is that overidentifying restric-
tions are exogenous assuming that the identifying restrictions are exogenous. The values
range from 0.29 to 0.77, which suggests that I cannot reject the null hypothesis, and
establishes the validity of the instruments.
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3.6.3 Borrowing from different sources: micro-credit versus
non-micro loans
Table 3.7 presents the results from different loan sources, namely micro-credit and
non-micro sources. The p-values from the over-identification tests range from 0.52 to
0.94, suggesting valid instruments. The differing sources are interesting as they offer
different loan contracts. Micro-credit offers loans under a group contract with joint
liability, whereas non-micro sources offer loans under individual contracts. The former
targets women while the latter appears to be gender neutral. The estimates in the first
row show the effect of men’s returns to borrowing from non-micro sources. They are
qualitatively similar to the estimates in Table 3.6. A 10% increase in men’s returns
or business income increases total expenditure by 6.6%. It also increases expenditures
on food by 5.9%, education by 10.6%, medicine by 13.5%, recreation 5.4%, personal
items 18.3%, children’s clothing by 7.2%, adult clothing by 5.8%, and men’s clothing by
3.5%, and decreases spending on women’s clothing by 2.1%. However, when the loan
is from micro-credit banks, men’s returns to borrowing increase the total expenditure
by 7.4%. It also increases spending on education by 29.1%, medicine by 19.1%, and
men’s clothing by 1.1%.13 In contrast, an increase in men’s return to borrowing from
13The second row gives the estimates of the interaction between profit and whether the household
borrowed from micro-credit. Thus, when a man borrows from micro-credit, the total effect of profit is
the sum of the estimates from row 1 and row 2. Similarly, to obtain the effect of profit when a female
borrows from non-micro source, I add an interaction between profit and the gender of the borrower.
The effect is then the sum of the estimates from row 1 and row 3. Finally, to obtain the effect of profit
when a female borrows from micro-credit, I need to add an additional interaction among profit, gender
of the borrower, and whether a household borrows from micro-credit. The effect is the sum of the first
four rows.
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micro-credit sources lowers expenditure on recreation by 1.5% and women’s clothing by
0.4%. These results show that households spend more on some female oriented items
and less on some male oriented items with men’s returns to borrowing from micro-credit
sources than non-micro sources. When it does lead to an increase in men’s goods and
decrease in women’s goods, these effects are less than those of borrowing from non-micro
sources. Finally, men’s returns from non-micro sources decrease the ratio of spending of
women’s clothing to men’s clothing whereas returns from micro-credit source increase
the ratio.
When a female borrows from a non-micro source, her returns to borrowing or busi-
ness income has a positive effect on total expenditure, spending on child clothing, food,
education, medicine, recreation, soap, and men’s and women’s clothing but has a nega-
tive effect on spending on adult clothing and personal items. In comparison, women’s
returns to borrowing from micro-credit sources have a larger positive effect on total ex-
penditures and spending on food, education, medicine, and men’s, women’s, children’s,
and adult clothing. Female returns to borrowing from micro sources have a larger neg-
ative impact on recreation and personal expenditures. Household total income also has
positive effect on expenditures that is different from the effect of men’s or women’s
business income. This differential impact contradicts the income pooling hypothesis.
Households spend more on goods such as education, medicine, clothing, and food
when there is an increase in both men’s or women’s returns to borrowing from micro-
credit as compared to non-micro sources. However, women’s returns from micro-credit
results in larger positive impact than men’s returns. This may be the result of the social
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development efforts like the “sixteen decision” that teach women the value of education,
nutrition, sanitation, and taking care of oneself and one’s children.14 The results above
show that women spend differently than men in rural Bangladesh. In particular, when
a woman starts contributing to the household income, she is able to allocate more of
this income toward goods that are valuable to her, proving that the income improves
her bargaining power.
3.6.4 Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on empower-
ment indices
The second wave of the survey asks all married women between 15 and 60 years
old extensive questions about their economic and non-economic decision making power,
mobility, political and legal awareness, networking ability, household tolerance toward
domestic violence, etc. These provide alternative measures of empowerment. I estimate
the effect of men’s and women’s returns to borrowing from different sources on these
empowerment measures using the same estimation strategy explained in section 4.2.
Table 3.8 reports the results and the p-value from the over-identification test which
range from 0.18 to 0.78. An increase in men’s returns to borrowing from non-micro
source leads to an increase in women’s economic decision making power, such as buying
or selling land and livestock while an increase in men’s returns from micro source lower
a woman’s ability to make these decisions. In contrast, men’s returns from micro source
14In the estimation, I include the logarithm of the absolute of negative profits and the interactions
of gender of the borrower and micro-credit. However, I do not report the results in Table 3.7 as none
of the results are statistically significant.
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lead to an increase in a woman’s ability to make major non-economic decisions such
as fertility and children’s education. Women’s returns to borrowing from micro and
non-micro sources have positive effect on both of these decision making abilities but
returns from micro source have larger impacts. Women’s income also has larger positive
impact on their mobility when they borrow from micro-credit banks. Mobility measures
the ease of traveling outside the household. Household income has a positive effect on
the economic decision making index but negative effect on mobility. As a household
gets wealthier, the sense of social propriety heightens which restricts the freedom of a
woman traveling outside the household. As a woman becomes more educated relative
to her husband, she is more involved in decisions regarding herself and her children, as
evidenced by the positive effect on non-economic index.
These result suggests that education and training are important for women in making
their own decisions, thus strengthening the argument for the need for social development
programs targeted toward women. The credit programs provide a group atmosphere and
a safety net where women can share information and network, building their self-esteem
and confidence to assert their rights at home, invest in business, become self-sufficient
and contribute to the family, which in turn lead to empowerment.15
15I estimate other indices as well, some of whose results are reported in Table 3.8. However, these
results are not significantly different than zero. Therefore, I do not discuss them any further.
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3.6.5 Program eligibility: mistarget
I examined alternative specifications to check for the robustness of my findings. One
alternative included estimation with a different land cut-off. The micro-credit programs
require the household to own no more than 0.5 acre of land to be eligible. However, this
restriction is not always enforced. One reason is mistargeting. Yet, another reason may
be misreporting by the participants, especially when the land is located far from the
village of residence. In rural communities, information verification is costly. Therefore,
program staff may rely on participants’ and their group members’ accounts. In addition,
they may be susceptible to bribes and corruption. The loan officers may adjust for land
quality as well and allow a household with more land to qualify. 16
Regardless of the reason for lax enforcement, excluding these mistargeted partic-
ipants may lead to sample selection bias. One way to check the robustness of such
exclusion is to reestimate the model using a progressively higher land cutoff for program
eligibility and see how sensitive the results are with the inclusions. I use four different
cutoffs- 0.75 acre, one acre, one and a half acres, and two acres. With the original
cutoff at one-half acre, 25% of the participants were mistargeted. This proportion falls
to 17% at 0.75 acre, 12% at one acre, 6% at one and a half acre, and 3% at two acre. A
comparison of the results shows that they are virtually identical to the results reported
above for total expenditure. The increase in total expenditure ranges from 4.6% to 6%
with varying land cutoffs when there is a 10% in profit from male borrowing. This is
16Pitt (1999) finds that participating households owning more than 0.5 acre of land have lower land
value than their non-participating counterparts.
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similar to the 5.7% increase found above. When females borrow, this effect ranges from
0.4% to 1.2%, again can be compared to the 0.7% found above. A similar story can be
told for negative profit, household income and the relative education of women to men.
Therefore, I conclude that the results reported above are robust and households owning
more than 0.5 acres can be safely excluded.
3.7 Discussion
This paper examines the effect of returns to borrowing, as it differs with the gender
of the borrower, on intra-household resource allocation. The paper highlights several
interesting results. First, different sources of income affect allocation of the income
differently. For the purpose of this paper, this result means that increase in women’s
business income from increased income earning opportunities for women will affect the
allocation of resources in their households differently than increase in men’s income. The
second main finding is that increase in a women’s income leads to increased consumption
of goods that provide them with greater utility. In contrast, increase in men’s income
decreases consumption of goods more valuable to women and increases consumption of
goods more valuable to men. This result means that allocation of household resources
favors the woman when her income increases. This is evidence of increased empowerment
or bargaining power. Thus, the first result shows that allocation of resources differs by
who earns while the second result shows how the allocation differs.
A third set of results find that households in rural Bangladesh are risk averse. The
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marginal effect of negative profit on consumption is greater than the marginal effect
of positive profit. Women and children become worse off than men when their income
further worsens. In addition, the results show that borrowing by itself doesn’t empower
women. On the contrary, borrowing without positive returns lowers women’s bargaining
power as evidenced from the allocation of resources away from female oriented goods.
This is not surprising because they would have to depend on other household members
to repay her loans. Thus, borrowing must accompany positive returns to have any signif-
icant empowerment effect in women’s lives. As such, credit programs must concentrate
on enhancing market accessibility and business training for women.
Finally, female micro-credit borrowers are better able to allocate their business in-
come toward their goods, make major household decisions, and travel outside the house-
hold than their non-micro counterparts. Thus, non-micro borrowing serves as reference
point and shows that the social aspects of micro-credit programs affect women’s em-
powerment above and beyond the monetary aspects. From policy perspective, credit
programs should emphasize social programs and try to include men as well. In addition,
commercial banks should introduce some social programs to women and men as well
and raise gender awareness.
I motivated this paper by the necessity to examine beyond the financial impact
of micro-credit programs so as not to erroneously conclude that targeting women is
not cost-effective. The results from this study show that micro-credit programs do have
social and development impact, namely, empowerment of women in a patriarchal society.
Once this impact is account for, targeting women may indeed prove to be cost-effective.
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Actually, credit programs should equally target men and women so as not to intensify
exploitation of women due to credit scarcity. Indeed, I have found that women borrowers




                Table 3.1A : Descriptive statistics for exogenous variables 
Variable Full Sample Std Dev 
Household Characteristics   
Education ratio (female/male) 1.07 1.26 
Highest grade completed by female spouse 0.99 2.17 
Highest grade completed by household (HH) head 1.65 2.86 
Household land (in decimal) 8.44 14.29 
     Land for micro-credit participants 7.19 13.35 
     Land for non-participants 9.59 15.03 
Number of people in HH 4.80 2.12 
Religion (1 if Muslim) 0.93 0.64 
Duration of the self-employment 4.97 7.74 
Residence in a micro-credit village 0.82 0.38 
# of female age 10-20 0.52 0.72 
# of female age 20-30 0.43 0.54 
# of female age 30-40 0.30 0.46 
# of female age 40-50 0.18 0.38 
# of female age 50-60 0.13 0.34 
# of female over 60 0.12 0.33 
# of male age 10-20 0.55 0.77 
# of male age 20-30 0.36 0.60 
# of male age 30-40 0.32 0.48 
# of male age 40-50 0.22 0.41 
# of male age 50-60 0.12 0.33 
# of male over 60 0.11 0.32 
# of girls under 10 0.70 0.85 
# of boys under 10 0.70 0.81 
   
Village level variables   
Price of rice 11.60 1.65 
Price of mustard oil 55.98 5.55 
Price of egg 2.58 0.64 
Price of milk 14.06 4.09 
Price of potato 7.42 2.06 
Price of flour 10.02 1.42 
Price of Sugar 28.94 3.03 
Price of onion 15.71 6.78 
Price of garlic 35.59 13.15 
Price of turmeric 55.56 12.59 
Price of salt 8.14 2.28 
Price of chicken 70.87 19.96 
Price of beef 54.80 13.83 
Price of soap (per bar) 10.70 2.45 
Price of tobacco  2.34 0.33 
Nearest distance to the market (km) 9.15 13.51 
Nearest distance to the shop (km) 9.16 8.68 
Nearest distance to the weekly market (km) 5.11 6.10 
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Table 3.1A : Descriptive statistics for exogenous variables (continued) 
Variable Full Sample Std Dev 
Household level instruments   
Distance in km to the lender 4.67 9.71 
      Distance in km (microcredit) 4.26 4.02 
      Distance in km (private loans) 5.59 19.85 
Interest rate (%) 23.98 27.58 
      Interest rate (microcredit) 17.80 13.78 
      Interest rate (private loans) 37.03 51.53 
# parents of HH head who own land 0.17 0.48 
# brothers of HH head who own land 0.37 0.92 
# sisters of HH head who own land 0.42 0.90 
# uncles of HH head who own land 0.75 1.39 
# aunts of HH head who own land 0.48 1.19 
# sons of HH head who own land 0.03 0.28 
# daughters of HH head who own land 0.06 0.37 
# living parents of HH head 0.67 0.76 
# living brothers of HH head 1.63 1.61 
# living sisters of HH head 0.57 0.93 
# living uncles of HH head 0.74 1.24 
# living aunts of HH head 0.25 0.69 
# living sons of HH head 0.83 1.24 
# living daughters of HH head 0.64 1.03 
   
Village level instruments   
% of irrigated land in village 44.83 31.46 
Whether the village has electricity 0.52 0.50 
Distance to the nearest fertilizer shop (km) 1.91 1.41 
Distance to the nearest health facility (km) 0.26 0.24 
Distance to the nearest high school (km) 2.62 2.13 
Distance to the nearest college (km) 8.85 5.50 
Distance to the nearest religious school (km)  3.56 3.49 
Whether the village has paved road 0.39 0.45 
Distance to the nearest paved road (km) 3.38 3.48 
Distance to the nearest bus stop (km) 12.36 15.67 
Whether the village has a bank 0.11 0.32 
Distance to the nearest bank (km) 6.25 6.94 
Whether the village has brick building 0.67 0.81 
Average village loan amount to women 
(in thousands of Taka) 5.89 7.63 
Average village loan amount to men 
(in thousands of Taka) 10.43 7.28 
Village level wage for female (per day) 25.93 14.03 
Village level wage for male (per day) 51.32 18.72 
Village level wage for children (per day) 25.01 10.67 
Sample size (household-year) 2,873  
                   Note: Mean for all households owning ½ acre or less land i.e. Eligible households. 
                             All prices are measured in Tk. 69TK= $ 1. All amounts are expressed in 1999 Taka. 
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Household Characteristics    
Education ratio (female/male) 1.29 0.88          0.41*** 






         0.25*** 






        -0.81*** 
Household land (in decimal) 7.28 9.04         -1.76*** 
     Land for micro-credit participants 7.13 7.38         -0.25** 
     Land for non-participants 7.93 10.55          2.62*** 
Number of people in HH 4.67 5.38         -0.71*** 
Religion (1 if Muslim) 0.73 0.92         -0.19*** 
Duration of the self-employment 9.54 8.38          1.16** 
Residence in a micro-credit village 0.90 0.80          0.10*** 
# of female age 10-20 0.58 0.50          0.08*** 
# of female age 20-30 0.41 0.47         -0.06*** 
# of female age 30-40 0.36 0.29          0.07*** 
# of female age 40-50 0.21 0.14          0.07*** 
# of female age 50-60 0.13 0.13          0.00 
# of female over 60 0.12 0.09          0.03*** 
# of male age 10-20 0.61 0.58          0.03** 
# of male age 20-30 0.32 0.48         -0.16*** 
# of male age 30-40 0.32 0.40         -0.08*** 
# of male age 40-50 0.21 0.14          0.07*** 
# of male age 50-60 0.13 0.11          0.02 
# of male over 60 0.10 0.13         -0.03* 
# of girls under 10 0.70 0.81         -0.11*** 
# of boys under 10 0.67 0.86         -0.19*** 
    
Household level instruments    
Distance in km to the lender 4.08 5.84         -1.75*** 
      Distance in km (microcredit) 3.84 5.69         -1.85*** 
      Distance in km (private loans) 5.07 5.95        -0.88*** 
Interest rate (%) 18.84 33.76      -14.92*** 
      Interest rate (microcredit) 17.91 17.41   0.50 
      Interest rate (private loans) 22.61 46.77      -24.16*** 
# parents of HH head who own land 0.12 0.22        -0.10*** 
# brothers of HH head who own land 0.33 0.45        -0.12*** 
# sisters of HH head who own land 0.36 0.56        -0.20*** 
# uncles of HH head who own land 0.67 0.90        -0.23*** 
# aunts of HH head who own land 0.39 0.71        -0.32*** 
# sons of HH head who own land 0.31 0.46  -0.15 
# daughters of HH head who own land 0.06 0.07 -0.01 
# living parents of HH head 0.64 0.76       -0.12*** 
# living brothers of HH head 1.52 1.86       -0.32*** 
# living sisters of HH head 0.56 0.60 -0.04 
# living uncles of HH head 0.66 0.94       -0.28*** 
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# living aunts of HH head 0.22 0.27        -0.05 
# living sons of HH head 0.79 1.02      -0.23*** 
# living daughters of HH head 0.59 0.81      -0.22*** 
Sample size (household-year) 1,220 641  
                    Note: Mean for all households owning ½ acre or less land i.e. Eligible households. 
                             All prices are measured in Tk. 69TK= $ 1. All amounts are expressed in 1999 Taka. 
                             A. Means for female borrowing households and male borrowing households conditional on borrowing.  
                             B. Difference is calculated by mean(female borrower)-mean(male borrower). * difference in mean significant at 10%, ** at 5%. *** at  
                                 1% 





                Table 3.2 : Summary statistics of the dependent variables by gender of borrower 

























Total expenditure 21285.84 2873 23265.75 1861 23617.59 1220 22596.09 641          1021.50*** 
Children’s medical 803.11 2790 908.42 1861 1009.47 1220 855.13 641           -154.34** 
Child clothing 315.63 2085 331.97 1717 331.23 1098 294.24 619              36.99** 
Adult clothing 1137.66 2873 1248.62 1861 1203.69 1220 1334.13 641           -130.44** 
Marriage 3282.42 126 3770.16 92 3643.88 63 4044.48 29          -400.60 
Recreation 172.10 2692 179.53 1520 133.89 805 244.27 715          -110.38** 
Personal 128.52 2722 137.27 1784 131.05 1148 148.50 636            -17.45*** 
Textile 338.26 503 355.26 344 394.87 220 332.94 124              61.92 
Furniture 1099.92 283 1050.60 203 1061.07 140 1027.35 63              33.71 
Household improvement 8857.28 291 9739.71 211 9616.04 139 9978.47 72          -362.42 
Household repair 712.84 991 739.98 891 689.48 470 847.36 221          -157.88** 
Household effect repair 51.06 214 61.23 146 51.35 99 82.042 47            -30.69 
Kitchen 149.75 2689 159.00 1861 178.09 1220 148.71 641             29.37*** 
Soap 296.29 2856 325.58 1852 346.30 1213 314.66 639             31.63*** 
Children’s Education 952.00 1630 982.55 1475 1118.35 965 909.76 510           208.59** 
Food 16555.51 2873 17861.99 1861 18432.84 1220 16775.49 641          1657.35*** 
Women’s clothing 562.23 1357 569.57 867 596.46 492 504.88 375              91.58*** 
Men’s clothing 201.03 1357 198.99 858 199.27 483 201.04 375               -1.76 
                   Note: The expenditures are measured yearly in Tk. 69TK= $ 1. All amounts are expressed in 1999  Taka.  
                    Sample sizes are household-year observations.  
                    a. Difference is calculated as mean(female borrower) – mean (male borrower)  
                        *** Difference in mean significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
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  Table 3.3 : Summary statistics of returns to borrowing, N, and other endogenous variables  
Variable (in thousands of Taka) Observation Mean Standard Deviation 
N for all borrower  1861 16.63 57.11 
N from micro-credit 1263 18.07 50.69 
       Grameen Bank 533 20.57 61.21 
       BRAC 379 16.42 40.94 
       BRDB  351 16.05 41.78 
N from private lender 598 13.57 68.66 
N from female borrower          1220 15.78 48.79 
       Micro-credit 979 17.39 53.07 
       Private-lender 241  9.20 23.67 
N from all male borrower   641 18.24 40.28 
       Micro-credit 284 20.41 41.46 
       Private lender 357 16.52 86.63 
Amount borrowed from private lender    598 9.63 22.30 
Amount borrowed from micro-credit 1263 13.39 15.42 
Gender of the borrower 2873 0.57 0.39 
Household borrows from micro-credit 2873 0.44 0.49 
Household income  2873 38.94 6.35 
                         Note: The expenditures are measured yearly in Tk. 69TK= $ 1. All amounts are expressed in 1999  Taka.  
                                    Sample sizes are household-year observations.  
 
Table 3.4 : First stage and reduced form estimates of selected identifying instruments 






























































































F- Statistic 14.14 13.78 32.33 42.00 29.97 152.62 
 
  Note: Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications and clustered by households. Log positive and log negative returns have    
1,861 observations.  Columns 3-6 have 2,873 observations. Average male and female loan amount are measured in 1,000 1998 taka.  
All specifications control for household characteristics and local prices and conditions. F-statistic is from a joint test of null hypothesis 
that coefficient estimates on the instruments are equal to zero. Exception is the last column which was estimated by Probit technique 
and therefore presents the χ2 value instead of the F-statistic. * indicates significance at 10 % (** at 5%, *** at 1%). All regressions 
include village fixed effects.  
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Table 3.5: OLS and IV-FE marginal effects of returns to borrowing  
Variables Total Expenditure Food Expenditure 
 OLS IV-FE OLS IV-FE 
Log N (positive) 0.05 0.57 0.14 0.23 
 (0.01)*** (0.15)*** (0.04)*** (0.11)** 
     
Log N (positive)*female borrower -0.07 -0.50 0.16 0.29 
 (0.34) (0.13)*** (0.07)** (0.10)*** 
     
Log N (negative) -0.06 -0.81 -0.04 -0.15 
 (0.02)*** (0.46)* (0.02)* (0.22) 
     
Log N (negative)*female borrower -0.03 -0.34 -0.02 -0.09 
 (0.25) (0.16)** (0.26) (0.25) 
     
Log Household income 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.39 
 (0.01)*** (0.12)*** (0.01)*** (0.11)*** 
R-Squared 0.605  0.603  
* Statistically significant at P < .10 
** Statistically significant at P < .05 
*** Statistically significant at P < .01 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications 






Table 3.6: Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on log expenditure 
Variables Total expenditure Adult clothing Child clothing Food Education Medicine Kitchen 
Log N (positive) 0.57 0.39 -0.45 0.23 0.56 0.54 -0.45 
 (0.15)*** (0.16) (0.15)*** (0.11)** (0.20)*** (0.26)** (0.21)** 
Log N (positive)*female borrower -0.50 -0.12  0.32 0.29 0.34 0.53 0.68 
 (0.13)*** (0.05) (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.15)** (0.22)** (0.29)** 
Log N (negative) -0.81 -1.08 -0.54 -0.15 -3.46 0.46 -0.06 
 (0.46)* (0.46)** (0.31)* (0.22) (2.23) (0.96) (0.12) 
Log N (negative)*female borrower -0.34 -0.45 -0.65 -0.09 -3.97 -0.58 -0.30 
 (0.16)** (0.21)** (0.67) (0.25) (2.40)* (1.03) (1.29) 
Log Household  income 0.54 0.24 0.43 0.39 0.22 0.514 -0.18 
 (0.12)*** (0.11)** (0.19)** (0.11)*** (0.07)*** (0.24)** (0.08)** 
Ratio female to male education 0.15 -0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.27 0.06 0.05 
 (0.14) (0.28) (0.03)*** (0.04)* (0.06)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** 







Table 3.6: Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on log expenditure (continued) 
Variables Recreation HH repair Personal Soap Men's clothing woman's clothing 
Women's 
/men's clothing 
Log N (positive) 0.11 0.16 1.17 -0.52 0.29 -0.53 -0.28 
 (0.04)** (0.36) (0.27)*** (0.20)** (0.13)** (0.17)*** (0.13)** 
Log N (positive)*female borrower -0.21 -0.11 -1.25 0.46 -0.23 0.86 0.12 
 (0.10)* (0.30) (0.25)*** (0.17)*** (0.10)** (0.15)*** (0.10) 
Log N (negative) 0.46 0.72 1.17 -0.97 -0.72 -0.49 -0.09 
 (0.19)** (0.56) (0.57)** (0.54)* (0.57) (0.28)* (0.31) 
Log N (negative)*female borrower -0.37 -0.64 -0.98 -0.74 0.93 -0.67 0.25 
 (0.21)* (0.59) (0.70) (0.58) (0.64) (0.29)** (0.36) 
Log Household income 0.20 0.06 0.35 -0.23 0.19 -0.18 -0.20 
 (0.09)** (0.03)* (0.15)** (0.11)** (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) 
Ratio female to male education -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.005 
 (0.03)** (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) 
Over-Id test  (Chi-sq  p-value) 0.371 0.214 0.588 0.298 0.770 0.431 0.382 
Standard errors are in parentheses. They are bootstrapped with 100 replications. Given that the expenditure uses prediction from the selection equations, bootstrapping is used to guarantee better 
properties than the use of the conventional variance-covariance matrix. They are also clustered by households.  
* Statistically significant at P < .10  ** Statistically significant at P < .05 *** Statistically significant at P < .01 
(a)- variables treated as endogenous, estimates from Instrumental Variable estimation.  






Table 3.7: Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on log expenditure: by the loan sources 
Variables Total expenditure Adult clothing Child clothing Food Education Medicine Kitchen 
Log N (positive) 0.66 0.58 0.72 0.59 1.06 1.35 0.45 
 (0.32)** (0.31)* (0.37)* (0.27)** (0.44)** (0.60)** (0.35) 
        
Log N (positive)* Micro-credit 0.08 0.18 0.37 0.28 1.85 0.56 -0.11 
 (0.03)** (0.27) (0.69) (0.31) (0.73)** (0.31)* (0.29) 
        
Log N (positive)*female borrower -0.41 -1.22 1.02 1.14 0.30 2.36 -0.48 
 (0.12)*** (0.56)** (0.50)** (0.45)** (0.16)* (1.28)* (0.34) 
        
Log N (positive)* Micro-credit * female borrower 0.49 0.59 0.48 0.25 1.18 0.22 0.33 
 (0.21)** (0.25)** (0.21)** (0.12)** (0.50)** (0.07)*** (0.28) 
        
Log Household  Income 0.30 0.64 0.33 0.44 0.29 0.71 0.34 
 (0.07)*** (0.30)** (0.09)*** (0.19)** (0.13)** (0.22)*** (1.91) 








Table 3.7: Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on log expenditure: by the loan sources (continued) 
Variables Recreation HH repair Personal Soap Men's clothing Woman's clothing 
Women’s/ 
men’s clothing 
Log N (positive) 0.54 -1.00 1.83 0.82 0.35 -0.21 -0.14 
 (0.29)* (0.77) (0.91)** (0.32) (0.16)** (0.11)* (0.08)* 
        
Log N (positive)* Micro-credit -0.69 1.65 -0.73 -1.05 -0.24 0.17 0.15 
 (0.32)** (0.48) (0.55) (0.85) (0.10)** (0.07)** (0.09)* 
        
Log N (positive)*female borrower -0.16 0.17 -2.31 -0.79 -0.17 0.60 0.13 
 (0.09)* (0.61) (1.02)** (0.35)** (0.07)** (0.31)* (0.13) 
        
Log N (positive)* Micro-credit * female borrower -0.18 -0.68 -1.33 1.37 0.10 0.05 0.05 
 (0.08)** (0.45) (0.59)** (1.47) (0.05)* (0.02)** (0.08) 
        
Log Household Income 0.60 0.67 0.31 0.22 0.28 0.08 0.12 
 (0.21)*** (0.57) (0.65) (0.22) (0.15)* (0.10) (0.13) 
Over-Id test  (Chi-sq  p-value) 0.887 0.940 0.520 0.817 0.941 0.790 0.603 
Standard errors are in parentheses. They are bootstrapped with 100 replications 
* Statistically significant at P < .10  ** Statistically significant at P < .05 *** Statistically significant at P < .01 







Table 3.8: Marginal effects of returns to borrowing on empowerment variables 
Variable Major economic decision Non-economic decision Mobility Political awareness Legal awareness 
Log N (positive) 6.54 -6.17 1.24 -5.52 1.75 
 (3.35)* (5.38) (1.29) (5.33) (2.85) 
      
Log N (positive)* Micro-credit -10.47 4.37 -1.19 3.32 1.86 
 (4.45)** (2.02)** (1.37) (3.53) (2.30) 
      
Log N (positive)*female borrower  5.19 8.63 1.12 5.81 -2.29 
 (2.44)** (4.93)* (0.65)* (5.53) (3.24) 
      
Log N (positive)* Micro-credit * female borrower 7.56 2.12 2.23 -4.51 1.10 
 (3.81)** (1.07)** (1.08)** (4.34) (2.26) 
      
Log Household income 7.92 4.18 -1.69 -3.80 4.20 
 (3.84)** (4.25) (0.78)** (1.11) (4.00) 
      
Ratio female to male education 0.12 0.45 0.048 0.12 0.29 
 (0.37) (0.14)*** (0.05) (0.12) (0.26) 
Over-Id test  (Chi-sq  p-value) 0.580 0.789 0.602 0.187 0.211 
* Statistically significant at P < .10 
** Statistically significant at P < .05 
*** Statistically significant at P < .01 
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications 






A1. Variable Description 
 
The main dependent variable is self-employment profit. This is calculated as total 
revenue from the business plus the value of consumption from production less the 
operating cost and opportunity cost of time. The operating expense is how much they 
incurred in production, raw material, and labor excluding their own. The opportunity cost 
of time is the product of the time investment and market wage. They were asked who 
invests time in the business and how much time they invest. The total time investment 
was derived from this. Land is defined as the amount of cultivable land the household 
owns in decimals. Education ratio is the education of the female spouse of the male head 
of the household divided by the education of the male head of the household. The bank 
loan dummy is defined as 1 if the households borrowed from formal commercial banks or 
informal markets, 0 otherwise. 
 
The total sample size is 4,421 combining both 1992 and 1999 survey. However, 1999 
survey added households from new villages but lacked village level information about 
these villages. Therefore, these households were dropped. In addition, households owning 
more than 5 acres of land were dropped as well to maintain comparability. Thus, the 
sample size reduced to 4,027. After the self-employment profit was calculated, there were 
several households with very high positive and very low positive. Therefore, to retain 
comparability, I excluded the outliers. Namely, I excluded any households with profit 
greater than 100,000 Taka and less then -100,000 Taka. These amounted to 115 
households. After dropping these and dropping the households that were ineligible to 
participate in the credit programs because of land ownership of greater than half acre 
(1039 households), the final sample size reduced to 2,873, with 1,263 households 






B1. Variable Description  
 
The mobility variable measures a woman's freedom of movement within and outside the village. 
The survey asked how she goes to banks, markets, health centers, or places outside the village 
excluding her parents' place. If she goes alone, I rank this the highest value. If she goes with other 
women, other people, her husband, or does not go at all, I rank accordingly, with not going as the 
lowest value. Thus, it ranges from 0 to 4, with mobility score of 0 if she does not go and a score 
of 4 if she goes alone. 
 
The Major economic decision making ability concerns four issues and who decides and 
implements these issues. The issues are housing repair, sale and purchase of livestock, borrowing 
money, and sale and purchase of land or equipment. I give all these issues equal weight. Her 
responses ranged from deciding and implementing herself, decide herself but implement jointly 
with husband, to less control, last one being husband decides and implements himself. There were 
five possible combinations of these responses. Each issue is given a value of 1. Thus, if her 
response was deciding and implementing herself for all four issues, this amounted to the highest 
index of 20. 
 
Major non-economic decision making ability asked who initiates the discussion on the following 
issues: number of children, when to have children, their education, their marriage, birth control 
decisions, and methods. I rank the answers in the following way, starting from the lowest: neither 
the wife nor her husband initiates, husband initiates, wife initiates, both initiates, corresponding to 
0, 1, 2, 3, respectively. Thus, imposing equal weight on the 6 issues, the highest is 18 reflecting 
her ability to initiate these discussions. Note that I give more put to joint initiation for these 
issues, which may reflect the husband's willingness to listen to his wife and may adopt her ideas. 
 
Legal awareness variable was determined by how much knowledge the woman has in terms of 
settlements in case of divorce, claim of property in case of her husband's death, and means to stop 
husband from remarrying when they are still married. In Muslim marriages, there is a amount 
specified prior to marriage that the husband must pay to the wife in case of a divorce. Highest 
value was given to the right answer. In terms of claim, presenting document of inheritance 
(marriage certificate is the best answer). Other answers, starting with second highest ranking is 
presenting a will, by other means, and cannot claim. For remarriage, she can press charges in the 
local administration. This was given the highest value. In decreasing order, other answers include 
not giving permission, charges to community, pressure by relatives, threat of divorce, and other 
ways. The ranks for these three variables were then summed to get the index for legal awareness. 
Lastly, the political awareness variable was derived for questions such as if she voted in last 
election, knows the member of the parliament in her area, ever protested against abuse, whether 
dowry is good, ever protested against a chairman. Then the dichotomous answers were summed 







B2: OLS, Dependent Variable is log Total Expenditure 
 
 
Variables Estimate Std Error 
Log N (positive) 0.050 (0.011)*** 
Log N (positive) * female borrower -0.072 (0.034) 
Log N (negative) 0.059 (0.021)*** 
Log N (negative) * female borrower -0.031 (0.255) 
Female borrower 0.019 (0.027) 
Log Household Income 0.057 (0.011)*** 
   
Household Characteristics   
Education ratio (female/male) -0.026 (0.008)*** 
Highest grade completed by female 
spouse 
0.042 (0.005)*** 
Age of household (HH) head -0.004 (0.001)*** 
Household land (in decimal) 0.034 (0.001)*** 
Number of people in HH 0.076 (0.011)*** 
Religion (1 if Muslim) 0.052 (0.038) 
Duration of the self-employment 0.004 (0.001)*** 
Residence in a micro-credit village 0.230 (0.571) 
# of female age 10-20 0.069 (0.017)*** 
# of female age 20-30 0.076 (0.026)*** 
# of female age 30-40 0.068 (0.031)*** 
# of female age 40-50 0.051 (0.033)** 
# of female age 50-60 0.004 (0.032) 
# of female over 60 0.010 (0.029) 
# of male age 10-20 0.078 (0.016)*** 
# of male age 20-30 0.113 (0.019)*** 
# of male age 30-40 0.196 (0.028)*** 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by household. All monetary 
values are measured in units of 1,000 in 1999 Taka. * indicates 
significance at 10% (** at 5%, *** at 1%). R-Square is 60.05
Variables Estimate Std 
Error 
# of male age 40-50 0.180 (0.033)*** 
# of male age 50-60 0.169 (0.039)*** 
# of male over 60 0.213 (0.039)*** 
# of girls under 10 -0.023 (0.014)* 
Profit Status (1=positive profit) 0.313 (0.147)** 
   
Village level variables   
Price of rice 0.042 (0.010)*** 
Price of mustard oil -0.002 (0.002) 
Price of egg 0.034 (0.016)** 
Price of milk 0.004 (0.003) 
Price of potato 0.006 (0.007) 
Price of flour 0.010 (0.010) 
Price of Sugar -0.005 (0.004) 
Price of onion 0.005 (0.003)** 
Price of garlic 0.000 (0.001) 
Price of turmeric 0.004 (0.001)*** 
Price of salt 0.009 (0.005)** 
Price of beef 0.005 (0.001)*** 
Price of chicken 0.003 (0.001)*** 
Price of soap (per bar) -0.011 (0.004)*** 
Price of tobacco  0.125 (0.030)*** 
Nearest distance to the market (km) -0.004 (0.001)*** 
Nearest distance to the shop (km) 0.007 (0.001)*** 
Nearest distance to the weekly market (km) 0.002 (0.002) 
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